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Two-Party Structural Countermandering
Benjamin Plener Cover*
ABSTRACT: The popular narrative surrounding gerrymandering frames it
as a performative phenomenon—achieved through the intentional manipulations
of malevolent partisan actors. Efforts to curb partisan gerrymandering
—which I call countermandering—have been performative, in turn, focusing
on constraining these bad actors through judicial review or mapmaker
neutrality. Yet performative countermandering has had limited success.
Judicial and institutional constraints are only sometimes available and are
often cumbersome and costly. More important, their utility is inherently
limited, because gerrymandering is not only performative. It is also
structural—an inevitable product of the American electoral schema itself.
This paper makes the case for structural countermandering. It explains why
transformative change to our electoral schema is urgently necessary. It also
hypothesizes that such transformative change has no practical chance of
success unless it preserves the two-party system. Accordingly, this paper
proposes a new electoral schema called MM2. It operates much like the
traditional Mixed-Member Proportional (“MMP”) system used successfully
for decades in Germany and New Zealand, but its goal is two-party, not
multiparty, proportionality. Like MMP, MM2 preserves personal, geographic
representation by selecting most legislators through single-seat districts; and it
implements structural countermandering by allocating additional seats to
political parties to compensate for any vote-seat distortion these districted
elections produce. But whereas MMP allocates these seats to achieve vote-seat
proportionality for every party, MM2 allocates these seats to achieve vote-seat
proportionality only for the top two parties. By preserving certain core features
of American democracy, while structurally nullifying gerrymandering, MM2
presents a promising and feasible prospect for transformative change.
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INTRODUCTION

The 2010 redistricting cycle was a good decade for partisan mapmakers.
Armed with ever-advancing “big data and modern technology,” they
strategically manipulated electoral boundaries “with unprecedented
efficiency and precision.”1 In 2012, the first election under the cycle’s new

1. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512–13 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“[B]ig data and modern technology . . . make today’s gerrymandering altogether different from
the crude linedrawing of the past. . . . Mapmakers now have access to more granular data about
party preference and voting behavior than ever before. . . . [A]dvancements in computing
technology have enabled mapmakers to put that information to use with unprecedented
efficiency and precision.”).
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congressional maps, Democrats won 1.4 million more votes, but Republicans
won the House by a seat margin of 234 to 201—the first time since 1996, and
the second since World War II, that a party won a majority of seats in the
House with a minority of votes.2 Several swing-state congressional maps
produced lopsided results through the cycle: in Ohio, Republicans
consistently won at least 12 of 16 seats, whether their vote share was 59
percent or 51 percent;3 in Pennsylvania, Republicans consistently won 13 of
18 seats, with vote share ranging between 49 percent and 55 percent;4 in
North Carolina, Republicans won 9 or 10 of 13 seats with vote share ranging
between 49 percent and 55 percent.5
But the most impressive cartographic feat was the 2011 Wisconsin
Assembly map, adopted on a party-line vote shortly after Republicans won the
trifecta (Governor’s mansion and both legislative chambers), and thus
unilateral districting power, for the first time in four decades.6 As its architects
intended, the map produced a decade-long Republican supermajority: in
2014, 2016, and 2020, Republicans won more than 60 percent of the seats
with less than 55 percent of the votes; in 2012 and 2018, Republicans won
more than 60 percent of the seats with less than half of the votes; even in the
blue wave of 2018, a whopping 15-point vote swing from two years prior
managed to flip just one seat, and Republicans still won 63 of 99 seats with
only 47 percent of the votes.7 By strategically manipulating electoral
boundaries, i.e., packing and cracking, the Wisconsin Assembly map twice
inverted the vote-seat relationship, conferring a majority of seats on the party
with a minority of votes. This vote-seat inversion is alternatively called minority
entrenchment or a wrong-winner election.8 No matter what you call it, this
2. Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html [https://perma.
cc/HEM9-ZNEM].
3. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1074 (S.D. Ohio 2019).
4. See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 764–65 (Pa. 2018).
5. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509–10 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
6. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 846 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
7. Mitchell Schmidt, 2020 Election Again Shows Lopsided Republican Legislative Maps, WIS. ST. J.
(Nov. 12, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/2020-election-again-showslopsided-republican-legislative-maps/article_d0c11425-df16-5d0b-a3e8-4954e7897652.html [https://
perma.cc/BN3X-WMFL].
8. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“By
entrenchment I mean a situation in which a party that enjoys only minority support among the
populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative power.”); Nicholas
Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions
Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 381 n.282 (2007) (using the term “minority entrenchment” to
describe cases where “the majority party in the state legislature only enjoys the support of a
minority of the electorate”); Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781,
814 n.207 (2005) (“minority-to-majority entrenchment”); Jack Santucci, Multiparty America?, 82
J. POL. 34, 34 (2020) (“wrong-winner elections (e.g., when the party with the most votes does not
win public office)”); Thomas Quinn, Throwing the Rascals Out? Problems of Accountability in Two‐
Party Systems, 55 EUROPEAN J. POL. RSCH. 120, 121 (2016) (“‘wrong-winner’ elections in two-party
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perverse result violates a foundational premise of electoral democracy: if two
parties compete for legislative seats, the party with more votes should win
more seats.9
This perversity occurs with troubling frequency. Professor Miriam Seifter
recently analyzed state legislative elections from 1968 to 2016, and found 267
cases where a party won control of a legislative chamber though its rival won
more votes.10 Republicans drew the 2011 Wisconsin Assembly map, but
Democrats can gerrymander with equal skill and zeal.11 Historically, both
parties have benefitted when electoral maps have produced perverse
outcomes. In Seifter’s study, those vote-seat inversions benefitted Republicans

systems, where the party winning the most votes does not win the most seats”); Alan Renwick, Do
‘Wrong Winner’ Elections Trigger Electoral Reform? Lessons From New Zealand, 45 REPRESENTATION 357,
357 (2009).
9. Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 4–5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782224 [https://
perma.cc/7V8S-8SGP] (“[M]ost minimally, we should expect that the candidate or party that
receives the most votes will win.”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 283, 287 (2014) (proposing a partisan alignment ideal, whereby “if a majority of
voters wish to be represented by a candidate from a certain party, this in fact is who represents
them”); Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, End Minority Rule: Either We Become a Truly Multiracial
Democracy or We Cease to Be a Democracy at All, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/10/23/opinion/sunday/disenfranchisement-democracy-minority-rule.html
[https://perma.cc/ZCQ5-CBEA] (“Democracy is supposed to be a game of numbers: The party
with the most votes wins.”); Daryl R. DeFord, Nicholas Eubank & Jonathan Rodden, Partisan
Dislocation: A Precinct-Level Measure of Representation and Gerrymandering, POL. ANALYSIS
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4), https://www.nickeubank.com/research [https://perma.cc/
F65Q-6SHW] (“In the most obvious normative failure, a party with less than half of the statewide
votes can receive more than half of the seats, which happens routinely in U.S. state legislatures.”);
DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES: HOW PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
COULD REVITALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 38 (2002) (Minority entrenchment “violate[s] one of
the most sacred tenets of democratic politics: majority rule”).
10. Seifter, supra note 9 (manuscript at 28). Seifter found an additional 78 cases where a
party won a majority of seats with a plurality, but not a majority, of votes, which occurs when the
votes cast for third party and independent candidates exceed the vote difference between the top
two parties. Id.
11. Federal courts have identified multiple congressional maps as intentional proDemocratic gerrymanders, including those drawn by New Jersey post-1980, by Texas post-1990,
and by Georgia post-2000. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 764 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (The congressional map New Jersey adopted post-1980 “was designed to increase
the number of Democrats, and to decrease the number of Republicans, that New Jersey’s voters
would send to Congress in future years.”); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S.
399, 410–11 (2006) (The congressional map Texas adopted post-1990 was “designed to favor
Democratic candidates . . . [u]sing then-emerging computer technology to draw . . . lines with
artful precision . . . [and was] later described as the ‘shrewdest gerrymander of the 1990s.’”
(citations omitted)); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1329 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947
(2004) (The congressional map Georgia adopted post-2000 “was an intentional effort to allow
incumbent Democrats to maintain or increase their delegation, primarily by systematically
underpopulating the districts held by incumbent Democrats, by overpopulating those of
Republicans, and by deliberately pairing numerous Republican incumbents against one
another.”).
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111 times, but Democrats 156 times.12 There is evidence that Republicans
gerrymandered more, more egregiously, and more successfully in the 2010
cycle.13 This may partly reflect greater Republican electoral success in 2010
state elections, which gave Republicans more control over the 2010 redistricting
process.14 Also, residential patterns (i.e., urban clustering of Democratic
voters) may make gerrymandering relatively easier for Republicans.15 But
gerrymandering appeals to mapmakers across party lines.
And gerrymandering offends average Americans across the political
spectrum. At a time when Americans seem to disagree on just about everything,
a strong bipartisan consensus condemns gerrymandering as an affront and a
threat to American democracy. We abhor the practice, and blame it for a host
of democratic ills: vote-seat distortions, minority entrenchment, unresponsive
legislatures, uncompetitive districts, uncontested races, low voter turnout and
external efficacy, increasing polarization and gridlock.16 And we demand what I
call countermandering—mechanisms to deter, limit, or mitigate gerrymandering

12.
13.

Seifter, supra note 9 (manuscript at 28).
SIMON JACKMAN, ASSESSING THE CURRENT NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTING PLAN 8 (2017), https://roseinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ExpertReport-of-Simon-Jackman.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG5C-EJYG] (“Recent decades show more
pro-Republican gerrymandering, as measured by the efficiency gap.”).
14. Of the 88 legislative chambers that held elections in 2010, Republicans won 53 of them,
flipping 20 previously controlled by Democrats. State Legislative Elections Results, 2010: State
Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_elections_results,_2010
[https://perma.cc/ZAJ2-FLTZ] (last updated Aug. 9, 2021). After the 2010 elections,
Republicans enjoyed trifectas (i.e., the Governor’s mansion plus majorities in both legislative
chambers) in 20 states. State Legislative Elections Results, 2010: Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_elections_results,_2010#Trifectas [https://perma.cc/9WQ8QAGG] (last updated Aug. 9, 2021).
15. Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and
Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 239, 257 (2013) (“[H]uman geography makes the
task of a Democratic cartographer far more difficult than that facing a Republican-favoring
cartographer . . . .”); Gretchen Helmke, Mary Kroeger & Jack Paine, Democracy by Deterrence: Norms,
Constitutions, and Electoral Tilting, AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17),
http://nebula.wsimg.com/4ed6b1c608e8232b21b94b1cdd9f4c60?AccessKeyId=FD7670AEAE
23BB8C3DAE&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 [https://perma.cc/A7WK-ZKUZ] (“[T]he most
extreme pro-Republican gerrymander nets more seats for Republicans than does the most
extreme pro-Democratic gerrymander for Democrats.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 159
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he voting strength of less evenly distributed groups will
invariably be diminished by districting as compared to at-large proportional systems for electing
representatives.”); Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle
for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 668 (2017) (“Given the way Democrats
and Republicans sort themselves geographically in many states, with Democrats concentrated in
urban areas and Republicans spread out in rural or exurban ones, a map reflecting this
differential population density would make it more difficult for Democrats to translate votes into
seats than for Republicans to do so.”); Nicholas Goedert, The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014
Update to the “Gerrymandering or Geography” Debate, 2015 RSCH. & POL. 1, 3 (2015). (“[T]he absence
of bias in 2014, just like the presence of bias in 2012, is explainable by a combination of
intentional gerrymandering and the asymmetric distribution of partisans.”).
16. See infra Section II.A.5.
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and these associated pathologies. Hence the disappointment when partisan
gerrymandering repeatedly fractured the Court, first in Bandemer in 1986,
then in Vieth in 2004, and then again in LULAC in 2006.17 And hence the
excitement when in fall 2016 a federal panel struck down Wisconsin’s
Assembly map as a partisan gerrymander.18 It was the first time a partisan
gerrymandering claim had ever succeeded in federal court—but not the last.
Soon more federal courts found more partisan gerrymanders, and hopes
swelled for a landmark countermandering ruling that would end the age of
partisan gerrymandering just as the Warren Court had ended the age of
malapportionment.
The Court dashed those hopes in the summer of 2019, with a 5-4 ruling
declaring that partisan gerrymandering claims present a nonjusticiable
political question.19 A supermajority of Americans favored federal judicial
countermandering,20 but the Rucho majority declined the invitation. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that partisan gerrymandering
is antidemocratic, but insisted that federal judicial countermandering is
incompatible with the limited role of the federal courts.21 And so, the
Supreme Court slammed shut the federal courthouse door it had left ajar 33
years prior.22
But Chief Justice Roberts assured Americans that their demands for
countermandering need not “echo into a void.”23 Instead, he suggested other
countermandering fora: state courts guided by state constitutional and
statutory provisions with no federal analogue; and independent mapmaking
bodies established by direct democracy or congressional mandate.24
Reformers are heeding this advice. Sixteen states now have constitutional or

17. See generally Davis, 478 U.S. 109 (holding that plaintiffs did not prove a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (upholding a District Court’s
decision to dismiss a gerrymandering claim); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399 (2006) (dividing the Court on a partisan gerrymandering claim).
18. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
19. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 (2019).
20. Kylee Groft, The Results are In: Most Americans Want Limits on Gerrymandering, CAMPAIGN
LEGAL CTR. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/update/results-are-most-americanswant-limits-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/X2AU-N4XL]; Bipartisan Poll Shows Strong Support
for Redistricting Reform, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org
/update/bipartisan-poll-shows-strong-support-redistricting-reform [https://perma.cc/59Y8-HD3N].
21. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (“Excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that
reasonably seem unjust. But the fact that such gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic
principles,’ does not mean that the solution lies with the federal judiciary. We conclude that
partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal
courts.” (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015)).
22. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 118–25, abrogated by Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
23. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
24. Id. at 2507–08.
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statutory provisions that prohibit partisan gerrymandering;25 and 15 states
rely primarily on a commission to draw electoral maps for congressional
and/or state legislative elections.26 Three states embraced these reforms in
2018;27 and one in 2020.28 The Census Bureau released new population
figures in April, and the 2020 redistricting cycle is now kicking into high gear,
and the forces of gerrymandering and countermandering will compete once
again, armed with another decade of technological advances.29
But I fear we underestimate what we’re up against, and overestimate the
prospects for successful reform, because we fundamentally misapprehend the
problem. We conceptualize gerrymandering, and design countermandering
strategies, in terms that are narrowly performative rather than structural. The
very term gerrymander forever casts Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry as
the personal embodiment of the hated practice,30 and frames the problem as
abuse of the electoral system—dirty tricks and political sabotage by partisans

25. The states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. See Redistricting
Criteria, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 16, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx [https://perma.cc/QLW3-6BL6].
26. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington. Creation of Redistricting
Commissions, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/redistricting/creation-of-redistricting-commissions.aspx#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/B7
A3-MVXC]. Other states use advisory or backup commissions. See Redistricting Commissions: State
Legislative Plans, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MP7-5WEY].
27. The states are Michigan, Colorado, and Missouri. Creation of Redistricting Commissions,
supra note 26. Michigan did so by citizens’ initiative. Id.
28. Virginia became the 15th state to adopt an independent redistricting commission. See
Creation of Redistricting Commissions, supra note 26.
29. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And gerrymanders will only get worse
(or depending on your perspective, better) as time goes on—as data becomes ever more finegrained and data analysis techniques continue to improve. What was possible with paper and
pen—or even with Windows 95—doesn’t hold a candle (or an LED bulb?) to what will become
possible with developments like machine learning.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312–13
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Technology is both a threat and a promise. On the one hand,
if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan gerrymandering, the temptation to use partisan
favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional manner will grow. On the other hand, these new
technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of
the burdens gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters and parties.”).
30. Reformers strategically use this personalization. One campaign has created a parody
social media presence for the late Elbridge Gerry: @GovGerry’s twitter bio reads: “I was a
Founding Father, governor & vice president. But today people only remember me for
‘Gerrymandering.’ Not cool. Let’s #EndGerrymandering!” Elbridge Gerry (@GovGerry),
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/GovGerry [https://perma.cc/BA2S-56U9] (last updated Aug. 9,
2021). Another is the “F*ck Gerry(mandering) Fund,” launched by Crooked Media to raise
money for redistricting initiatives. Lucy Diavolo, The Team Behind Pod Save America Launches the
F*ck Gerry(mandering) Fund, TEENVOGUE (May 17, 2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/
pod-save-america-crooked-media-fuck-gerrymandering-fund [https://perma.cc/V9BG-5BBL].
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with a zero-sum, scorched-earth approach to electoral democracy.31 This
performative framing focuses on the partisan mapmaker rather than the
underlying electoral system that invites gerrymandering and produces
pathologies. The problem is how partisans discharge the mapmaking
function, wielding the districting pen like a weapon.
And the only thing that stops a bad guy with a pen is a good guy with a
pen. So the reform movement invests its efforts in two primary strategies:
judicial countermandering, which seeks to empower courts with adequate legal
standards to identify, invalidate, and remedy gerrymanders; and institutional
countermandering, which seeks to transfer mapmaker power to an institutional
body that will eschew gerrymandering and draw fair maps. Judicial
countermandering disarms the partisan mapmaker, so she cannot wield the
pen as a political weapon. Institutional countermandering gives the pen to an
independent body designed to use it responsibly.
In this Article, I challenge this performative framing with a structural
account that attributes present pathologies not just to partisan players, but to
the game itself. Every state in the nation elects state and federal legislators
using a common approach I refer to as the American Electoral Schema
(“AES”): geographically partitioning the state into (usually single-seat)
districts, and awarding each district seat to the individual candidate most
preferred by the most district voters. (I use the word schema to describe a
family of electoral systems that share a common bundle of identical or similar
structural components that operate in combination to produce similar
effects.) Under the structural logic of AES, a party’s success depends not only
on its popularity, i.e., its statewide vote share, but also its efficiency, i.e., how
it translates votes into seats. And efficiency depends critically on how the
party’s supporters are distributed geographically across electoral districts. So
an electoral map can interact with the underlying political geography to
distort the overall vote-seat relationship.
This structural feature of AES is an open invitation to intentional partisan
gerrymandering. For reasons I explain in Part I, judicial and institutional
countermandering may constrain intentional partisan gerrymandering to
some extent, perhaps avoiding the most egregious gerrymanders, but only at
great cost, and they are unlikely to entirely extirpate partisan manipulation
from the mapmaking process.
And precisely because judicial and institutional countermandering
strategies focus on the performative gerrymandering of partisan mapmakers,
there’s only so much they can do about unintentional gerrymandering. AES
is structurally vulnerable to distorted vote-seat relationships, not only when
partisan mapmakers wield the districting pen, but also when political

31. See generally DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO
STEAL AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY (2016) (explaining how politicians used tricks and redistricting to
return to power).
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geography conspires with ostensibly neutral districting criteria to produce
unintentional gerrymandering. A politics-blind computer algorithm, guided
by traditional criteria like contiguity, compactness, and preservation of local
political boundaries, may unintentionally pack and crack, simply because
Democrats cluster in cities, while Republicans disperse themselves in more
sparsely populated rural areas.32
The problem is the game, not just the players. And the only viable
solution is to fundamentally change the game through a strategy of structural
countermandering, replacing AES with an alternative electoral system less
vulnerable to these pathologies—a system that better serves contemporary
American democracy.
But structural countermandering faces its own challenge: feasibility. It is
not enough to identify some theoretical electoral system that works better on
paper. Any serious effort at structural countermandering must address what
Dean Gerken calls the “here to there” problem of electoral reform,33 and
address “what ought to be the central question in election reform but is not:
how to get change passed in this country.”34
Most proposals for more proportional electoral systems fail the “here to
there” test because they depart too radically from AES. Americans hate
gerrymandering and the associated pathologies that AES produces, but they
like the personal, geographic representation it facilitates: every person across
the state has an individual representative who resides in, and is accountable
to, a territorial community of neighbors who share common values and
interests. And AES produces something else: two-party, legislative
majoritarianism, where virtually every federal and state legislator is either a
Republican or a Democrat, and each legislative chamber is generally
controlled by a single-party majority. In stark contrast, systems of proportional
representation tend to produce multiparty democracy, where significant seat
share goes to three or more parties, who must form a multi-party governing
coalition. The relative merits of these alternative systems are the subject of a
robust academic debate which this Article makes no effort to resolve. But this
Article takes seriously a two-party hypothesis: that party elites invested in the
status quo will successfully defeat any proposal for an alternative electoral
system that poses an immediate threat to the two-party system. At least for the
near-term, American bipartyism may be entrenched, an exogenous constraint
on any electoral system reform.
But we can eliminate gerrymandering while preserving a two-party
system. This Article proposes an electoral schema to do precisely that. I call
32. See generally Chen & Rodden, supra note 15 (showing “substantial bias can . . . emerge
from patterns of human geography”).
33. See Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Election Reform, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 33, 33 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2010).
34. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Election Reform, supra note 33, at 33.
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this proposed schema Mixed-Member Top-Two Proportional (“MM2”),
because it operates much like the traditional Mixed-Member Proportional
(“MMP”) system used successfully for decades in Germany and New Zealand,
but replaces the broader form of proportionality used in MMP with a
narrower form of two-party proportionality. Like MMP, MM2 preserves
personal, geographic representation by selecting most legislators through
single-seat districts; and it implements structural countermandering by
allocating additional seats to political parties to compensate for any vote-seat
distortion these districted elections produce. But whereas MMP allocates
these seats to achieve vote-seat proportionality for every party, MM2 allocates
these seats to achieve vote-seat proportionality only for the top two parties.
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I presents the premise that we
need two-party structural countermandering. It describes how our electoral
schema, unlike many in Europe and elsewhere, inevitably invites
gerrymandering and associated pathologies; it explains why we need structural
rather than merely performative countermandering to combat these
pathologies; and it argues that, as a matter of feasibility, such structural
countermandering must preserve the two-party system.
Part II presents the proposal for reform, explaining how MM2 can
achieve two-party structural countermandering. Using a concrete example
based on the actual results of the 2018 Wisconsin Assembly, it demonstrates
how even the simplest version of MM2 could have neutralized one of the
decade’s most egregious partisan gerrymanders, eliminating the vote-seat
inversion while promoting responsiveness, competitiveness, and voter
turnout. It then delves into the details of MM2 and advances a specific version
of MM2 characterized by several related design choices.
II. THE PREMISE: WHY WE NEED TWO-PARTY STRUCTURAL
COUNTERMANDERING
A. WHY WE NEED COUNTERMANDERING
This Section explains the need for countermandering. It describes the
nearly uniform American approach for electing legislators at both the state
and federal levels, and it contrasts this approach to one that would produce
proportional representation. It then discusses three important consequences
of the American system: personal, geographic representation, which is
desirable; two-party legislative majoritarianism, which is normatively
contested; and gerrymandering and associated anti-democratic harms, which
are obviously pernicious, and which demand serious efforts at reform.
1. The American Electoral Schema
The states use remarkably similar methods to elect state and federal
legislators. This common approach goes by several names, including First-
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Past-The-Post (“FPTP”), Winner-Takes-All, and Single-Member Plurality.35 In
this Article, I will use the term American Electoral Schema (“AES”).
Consider a legislative body with 𝑛 seats. AES combines the following
elements:
(1) Geographic electoral districting. The schema geographically partitions
the state into electoral districts, assigns seats to districts, and elects
district representatives through district elections with district
residency requirements for both candidates and voters.
(2) Low district magnitude. The number of representatives elected from a
district is low, usually one. Political scientists often use the term
district magnitude, denoted 𝑀, to describe the number of
representatives assigned to a single electoral district.36
(3) Under AES, 𝑀 1 and the electoral map simply consists of 𝑛 singlemember districts.
(4) Nominal choice. Voters choose people, not parties. Ballot notation may
indicate party nomination or party affiliation, and voters may vote
based on party, but the choice is formally structed in terms of
individual candidates rather than political parties.
(5) Categorical choice. Voters select the single candidate they most prefer,
rather than ranking all candidates. This makes voting easier for
voters and administrators but limits the information a ballot provides
about a voter’s overall preferences.
(6) Plurality election formula. The single-member district awards its seat to
the candidate with more votes than any other single candidate, even
if less than other candidates combined.37
Every state use AES when electing state and federal legislators, with
limited intra-schema variation. In the first five decades following the
founding, states used a variety of methods to elect representatives to the U.S.
House,38 but Congress has required electoral districts since 1842 and singleseat electoral districts since 1967.39 Each state gets two U.S. senators with
35. See, e.g., Denis K. Kadima, Choosing an Electoral System: Alternatives for the Post-War
Democratic Republic of Congo, 2 J. AFRICAN ELECTIONS 33, 36 (2006) (“The SMP is also known as
‘first-past-the-post’, ‘winner-takes-all’, ‘simple majority’ or ‘relative majority’.”).
36. See, e.g., Kenneth Benoit, District Magnitude, Electoral Formula, and the Number of Parties, 39
EUR. J. POL. RSCH. 203, 203 (2001).
37. Richard H. Pildes & G. Michael Parsons, The Legality of Ranked-Choice Voting, 109 CALIF.
L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2021) (manuscript at 114–15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563257 [https://perma.cc/5QMH-JXHU].
38. Stephen Calabrese, Multimember District Congressional Elections, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 611,
612 (2000) (distinguishing between four methods: “(1) Single-Member District Elections”; “(2)
General-Ticket Elections”; “(3) Plural-District Elections”; and “(4) At-Large Elections”).
39. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2018). When a state is apportioned only one representative, the entire
state serves as a single-member district. The states that received one representative in the 2010
apportionment are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wyoming. 2010 Census Apportionment Results, at tbl. 1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2010), https://
www.census.gov/data/tables/2010/dec/2010-apportionment-data.html [https://perma.cc/JDG2-
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staggered terms, so the entire state serves as a single electoral district.40 Forty
states rely exclusively on single-seat districts for each legislative chamber, and
forty-eight states rely exclusively on single-seat districts at least for the upper
chamber; of the ten states that use multi-seat districts for at least one legislative
chambers, six use two-member districts, one uses three-member districts, and
three use varying district magnitudes.41 Of the 7,383 seats in the 50 state
legislatures, 6,301 (85.3 percent) are elected from single-seat districts.42 With
two exceptions, every state uses categorical, nominal choice when electing
federal and state legislators.43 Georgia and Louisiana hold a subsequent toptwo run-off election if no candidate wins a majority in the general election,
but every other state applies the plurality election formula to the general
election for federal and state legislators.44 In sum, subject to limited intraschema variation, AES has achieved monolithic use in contemporary
SLVJ]. The Elections Clause gives states primary authority, but Congress ultimate authority, to
regulate “[t]he Times, Place, and Manner of” federal legislative elections. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
For a helpful summary of historical changes in federal statutory requirements for House
elections, see Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI.
HIST. 159, 167 tbl. 2 (1998).
40. The original Federal Constitution provided for appointment of U.S. senators by state
legislatures. But state legislatures increasingly made these appointments on the basis of a state
preference election, and the Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, mandated direct
election of U.S. senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
41. In Vermont the House uses 𝑀 ∈ 1,2 ; the Senate uses 𝑀 ∈ 1,6 . VT. CONST. ch. II, §
13; Id. ch. II, § 18; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1881 (2021). In West Virginia the House uses 𝑀 ∈
1,5 ; the Senate uses 𝑀 2. W. VA. CONST. art VI, § 4; Id. art. VI, § 8; W. VA. CODE § 1-2-2 (2011).
In New Hampshire the House uses 𝑀 ∈ 1,11 ; the Senate uses 𝑀 1. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9;
Id. pt. II, art. 26; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662:5 (2012). In Maryland the House uses 𝑀 3; the
Senate uses 𝑀 1. MD. CONST. art. III, § 3. In Arizona, Idaho, New Jersey, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Washington the House uses 𝑀 2; the Senate uses 𝑀 1. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt.
2, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 5; S.D. CONST.
art. III, § 5; WASH. CONST. art II, §43; WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090 (2019).
42. See State Legislative Chambers That Use Multi-Member Districts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_chambers_that_use_multi-member_districts [https://perma.cc/DR
64-WPRT] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021).
43. Maine and Alaska have recently adopted ranked choice voting, which I discuss in greater
detail infra Section II.C.
44. See Runoff Election, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Runoff_election [https://
perma.cc/73Y4-2A8S] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021). Different voting rules are possible with
multi-member districts: (1) under bloc MMP each voter gets one vote for each open seat, she can
only vote once for a particular candidate, and she must use all her votes; (2) under bloc with
partial abstention (“BPA”) MMD each voter gets one vote for each open seat, she can only vote
once for a particular candidate, and she chooses whether or not to use all her votes; (3) under
staggered MMD, two legislators represent a single district but elections take place in different
years; and (4) in post MMD, each seat is assigned a numbered post and candidates run for a
specific post. For lower chamber elections, each of the ten states that use MMDs use BPA, post,
or a combination of the two; for upper chamber elections, the two states that use MMDs use bloc
or staggered. For lower chambers: Arizona, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Vermont,
and West Virginia use BPA; Idaho and Washington use post; and Maryland and South Dakota use
a combination of BPA and post. For upper chambers: Vermont uses bloc and West Virginia uses
staggered. See State Legislative Chambers That Use Multi-Member Districts, supra note 42.
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American elections for federal and state legislators.45
2. A Stylized Foil Schema
Despite this striking uniformity, AES is not the only way to choose
legislators. I discuss more alternatives in Section II.C, infra, but for now I
briefly present a stylized schema of list proportional representation as a
conceptual foil to AES. Here is a starkly different way a state could choose
legislators:
(1) District magnitude 𝑀 𝑛. Treat the entire state as a single multimember electoral district.
(2) No geographic electoral districting. With a single district, there are no
electoral boundaries to draw.
(3) List choice. Voters choose parties, not people.
(4) Categorical choice. In the simplest, categorical-choice version, the voter
selects the single party she most prefers.
(5) Proportional electoral formula. Award seats to parties in proportion to
their vote share,46 using some specified method of seat allocation.47
Compare AES to list proportional representation: AES geographically
45. As I discuss in Section II.B, infra, while all states draw electoral maps, states vary
significantly in who draws the map, by what process, and according to what substantive criteria.
Another area of significant intra-schema interstate variation is ballot access rules. Generally, states
run primary elections using the same electoral schema, but there are important differences in
terms of who participates. See Ballot Access for Major and Minor Party Candidates, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_for_major_and_minor_party_candidates [https://perma.cc/
AU6N-8YZT] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021); State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primarytypes.aspx [https://perma.cc/R987-7F92].
46. Once the system determines how many seats each party gets, each party must determine
which members get its seats. There are many ways to do this, but the simplest is a so-called closedlist system where each party predetermines a ranked list of members, and the party’s seats are
allocated to members according to that list until all the party’s seats are filled. See, e.g., Dominik
Hangartner, Nelson A. Ruiz & Janne Tukiainen, Open or Closed? How List Type Affects Electoral
Performance, Candidate Selection, and Campaign Effort 2 (VATT Inst. for Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
120, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418767 [https://perma.cc/
4HBD-BH54].
47. Generally, it may not be possible to achieve perfect vote-seat proportionality for every
party because there are a finite number of seats which must be allocated in integer, rather than
fractional, form. For this reason, it is necessary to choose an allocation method that approximates
proportionality for every party. There are multiple allocation methods to choose from, including
“highest average” methods (like D’Hondt and Sainte-Lagu) and “largest remainder” methods
(like Hare and Droop), and a robust literature comparing these alternatives. See, e.g., Michael
Gallagher, Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and
Majorities, 22 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 469, 470 (1992); Juraj Medzihorsky, Rethinking the D’Hondt
Method, 1 POL. RSCH. EXCH. 1, 1–2 (2019); FRIEDRICH PUKELSHEIM, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:
APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 71–103 (2017). Note that Congress uses
such an allocation method when dividing 435 seats among 50 states proportional to state
population. Computing Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 1, 2021), https://
www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/congressional-apportionment/about/computing.html [https://
perma.cc/F2MV-2UL8].
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partitions the state into multiple single-member districts while list
proportional representation uses the entire state as one large multi-member
district; AES asks voters to choose people, not parties, while list proportional
representation asks voters to choose parties, not people; AES uses a plurality
formula to award each district’s seat while list proportional representation
uses a proportional formula to award all the seats in the legislative body.
Just as AES uses distinctive structural components, so too does it produce
distinctive outcomes. The next three subsections explore three that will
feature prominently in my argument: personal, geographic representation;
two-party legislative majoritarianism; and the pathologies associated with
gerrymandering.
3. Personal, Geographic Representation
One upside to AES is personal, geographic representation: every person
across the state has an individual representative who resides in, and is
accountable to, a territorial community united by shared values and interests.
In contrast, list proportional representation has no local representatives
because it does not use geographic electoral districting.
Political science and election law scholarship recognizes the value of
personal, geographic representation.48 James Madison considered “[i]t . . . a
sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted
with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.”49 This
representative-constituent link remains significant today. The constituent can
direct her grievances, policy preferences, and requests for government
services to a single local representative, rather than some far-away party
bureaucracy.50 The representative is well positioned to ascertain and advocate
for the interests of her constituents.51 By channeling politics into “a placebased set of representational relationships,” personal, geographic representation
“invites neighbors to engage one another in a debate about shared values,

48. Benjamin Plener Cover & David Niven, Geographic Gerrymandering, 15 HARV. L & POL’Y
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the
Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1390–97 (2012); James A. Gardner, What is “Fair”
Partisan Representation, and How Can It Be Constitutionalized? The Case for a Return to Fixed Election
Districts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 555, 576–82 (2007); Hilary Pearse, Geographic Representation and
Electoral Reform, 28 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV. 26, 28 (2005); Josep M. Colomer, Personal and
Party Representation, in PERSONAL REPRESENTATION: THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS 1–20 (Josep M. Colomer ed., 2011).
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 379 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
50. David Niven, Benjamin Plener Cover & Michael Solimine, Are Individuals Harmed by
Gerrymandering? Examining Access to Congressional District Offices, 102 SOC. SCI. Q. 29, 40–43 (2021).
51. Stephanopoulos, supra note 48, at 1392–93 (under “theory of communal representation,”
when electoral districts align with meaningful territorial communities, “[v]oters should be less
confused and more politically engaged” and “it should be relatively straight-forward for elected
officials to identify and advance their districts’ interests.”).
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interests, and issues.”52
The value that voters accord to personal, geographic representation is
suggested by the so-called personal vote, “that portion of a candidate’s
electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities,
qualifications, activities, and record.”53 It is also suggested by the work of a
district representative, which goes beyond the business of law-making and
includes communicating with local constituents, providing casework services
to individual constituents, and securing public resource allocations to her
district.54
4. Two-Party Legislative Majoritarianism
A more contested feature of AES is two-party legislative majoritarianism.55
According to Duverger’s Law, named after the French sociologist Maurice
Duverger, an electoral system like AES “favour[s] the two-party system”56 while
a system like list “proportional representation favour[s] multi-partism.”57 The
electoral system influences the party system through a mechanical effect and
a psychological effect.58 The mechanical effect refers to the way AES translates
votes into seats, and electoral parties (parties that run candidates) into
legislative parties (parties that win seats). To win a seat under AES, a party
needs a base of supporters sufficiently numerous and geographically compact
to constitute a plurality in a single-seat district. The psychological effect refers
to the way voters, candidates, and parties strategically modify their behavior

52. Cover & Niven, supra note 48; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Civil Republicanism, Public Choice
Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 154
(2008) (“Community stakeholders are given the opportunity to confront one another . . . and
transform themselves, their preferences, their intentions, and the community by searching for
commonly held values, generating those public values, and agreeing upon the common good.”).
53. BRUCE CAIN, JOHN FEREJOHN & MORRIS FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY
SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 9 (1987); see also Tom W. Rice & Alisa A. Macht, Friends
and Neighbors Voting in Statewide General Elections, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 448, 448 (1987) (“Gubernatorial
and senatorial general election candidates from 46 states over the 1976 to 1982 period were
examined and results indicate the average candidate polled 3.66 percentage points more of the
general election vote in his or her ‘home county’ than another candidate from the same party
but different county could have expected to garner.”).
54. Mark C. Ellickson & Donald E. Whistler, Explaining State Legislators’ Casework and Public
Resource Allocations, 54 POL. RSCH. Q. 553, 560–61 (2001).
55. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 680 (1998) (“The FPTP system virtually ensures
continuing two-party dominance.”).
56. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE
MODERN STATE 217 (Barbara North & Robert North trans., Science ed. 1963) (1954) (emphasis
omitted).
57. Id. at 239 (emphasis omitted).
58. See generally William Roberts Clark & Matt Golder, Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing
the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws, 39 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 679 (2006)
(reviewing Duverger’s theory to find that social forces impact the number of political parties a
country will have).
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to account for the mechanical effect. Under AES, third party candidates are
often viewed as “spoilers”: if you vote for the third-party candidate you like the
most, you may end up with the major party candidate you like the least.59
The United States does indeed have a strong two-party system, where
virtually every federal and state legislator is either a Republican or a
Democrat. This yields legislative majoritarianism, where the legislature is
generally controlled by a single-party majority rather than a multi-party
coalition. Every federal legislator is either a Republican or a Democratic,
except for two U.S. senators, Bernie Sanders of Vermont and Angus King of
Maine, who are independents but caucus with the Democrats.60 According to
Ballotpedia, “[a]s of July 30, 2021, 32 state representatives in 10 states
identify[] as independents or” members of a third party,61 whereas 5,366 state
representatives identify as either Democrats or Republicans; “seven state
senators in five states identify[] as independent or” members of a third party,
whereas 1,957 senators identify as either Democrats or Republicans.62
In stark contrast, systems of proportional representation tend to produce
multiparty democracy, where significant seat share goes to three or more
parties, which must then form a multi-party governing coalition.63 Since 2017,
59. Perhaps the most famous American example occurred in 2000, when George W. Bush
won Florida—and the presidency—by 537 votes, while 97,488 Floridians voted for Ralph Nader.
See Michael C. Herron & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Did Ralph Nader Spoil Al Gore’s Presidential Bid?: A BallotLevel Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 205, 206
(2007). In the 2016 presidential election, Jill Stein (Green Party) and Gary Johnson
(Libertarian) played similar roles in some swing states. Pildes & Parsons, supra note 37
(manuscript at 116).
60. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://
perma.cc/U2HG-NZQ6] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021); Party Breakdown, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES PRESS GALLERY, https://pressgallery.house.gov/member-data/party-breakdown
[https://perma.cc/NGE6-EYKH] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021).
61. Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Partisan_composition_of_state_legislatures [https://perma.cc/SW76-FP6G] (last updated Aug.
10, 2021). Specifically, state lower chambers have 11 third party members: the Vermont house
has 7 members of the Vermont Progressive Party, Maine and Wyoming each have one Libertarian,
New York has a single house member from the Independence Party and Maine has one member
of the Independent for Maine Party. Id. State lower chambers have 20 independents: Vermont
has 5; Maine and Alaska each have 3; Louisiana has 3; Mississippi has 2; California, Massachusetts,
New Mexico, and Wyoming each have 1. Id. Alaska has one nonpartisan member. Id.
62. Id. The only upper chamber with third-party members is the Vermont senate, which has
two members of the Vermont Progressive Party. Id. The Minnesota senate has two independents,
while the Arkansas senate, the Oregon senate, and the Pennsylvania senate each have one
independent. Id.
63. Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments:
The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 979,
980 (2014) (“Coalition governments, which are the norm in parliamentary systems operating
under proportional representation electoral rules, must confront a wrinkle in policymaking that
is absent under single-party government: Policy is made jointly by parties that are separately
accountable at election time.” (emphasis omitted)); Dimiter Toshkov, Lars Mäder & Anne
Rasmussen, Party Government and Policy Responsiveness. Evidence from Three Parliamentary Democracies,
40 J. PUB. POL’Y 329, 335 (2020) (“While single-party majority cabinets are common in the UK,
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the Dutch government has been a coalition of four parties.64 Eleven parties
currently hold seats in the Israeli Knesset.65
There is no consensus on the desirability of this two-party, majoritarian
system. Advocates of proportional, multiparty democracy make a strong
case.66 But defenders of majoritarian, biparty democracy parry with a strong
rejoinder, arguing that proportional, multiparty democracy may produce
weak and unstable governing coalitions vulnerable to snap elections and
extremist parties.67 I will return to this debate in Section II.C, infra.
5. Pathologies
There is one feature of AES that few would dare to defend: its
vulnerability to gerrymandering and associated pathologies, including voteseat distortions, minority entrenchment, unresponsive legislatures,
uncompetitive districts, uncontested races, low voter turnout and external
efficacy, and increasing polarization and gridlock. The fundamental cause of
all these pathologies is not the partisan mapmaker, but rather AES itself,
which facilitates both intentional and unintentional gerrymandering, and
more generally ill serves contemporary American democracy.
Under AES, electoral fortunes turn discontinuously on whether a
candidate’s support exceeds a threshold: With below-threshold support, the
candidate loses and each vote she gets is lost; with above-threshold support,
multiparty coalitions are typical in Germany and in Denmark, where one also observes the
phenomenon of multi-party minority coalition cabinets.” (emphasis omitted)).
64. A Guide to Dutch Political Parties, EXPATICA (June 9, 2021), https://www.expatica.com/
nl/living/gov-law-admin/dutch-political-parties-108098 [https://perma.cc/3358-KVPM].
65. Government: Political Parties in Israel, ISR. SCI. & TECH. DIRECTORY, https://www.science.
co.il/gov/Parties.php [https://perma.cc/C6VE-T5D4] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021).
66. LEE DRUTMAN, BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP: THE CASE FOR MULTIPARTY
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 206–39 (2020); Christopher Ingraham, How to Fix Democracy: Move Beyond
the Two-Party System, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2021, 3:14 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/business/2021/03/01/break-up-two-party-system [https://perma.cc/X65M-ND54];
Santucci, supra note 8, at 35–36; Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP.
CT. REV. 331, 333–35.
67. Rivka Weill, On the Nexus of Eternity Clauses, Proportional Representation, and Banned Political
Parties, 16 ELECTION L.J. 237, 240 (2017) (“[PR] elections encourage extremist—and even
secessionist—political parties to compete against weak and unstable governments, and foster
them with political and economic resources to advance their agendas.”); Barry Eichengreen &
David Leblang, Exchange Rates and Cohesion: Historical Perspectives and Political‐Economy
Considerations, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 797, 805 (2003) (“Proportional representation (PR)
may lead to fragmented party systems and unstable governing coalitions.”); André Blais & Marc
André Bodet, Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy
Makers?, 39 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1243, 1246 (2006) (“[In PR systems], extremist parties can
more easily win votes . . . [because] parties or voters may fail to coordinate[] and these
coordination failures may allow an extremist government to form.”); PIPPA NORRIS, RADICAL
RIGHT: VOTERS AND PARTIES IN THE ELECTORAL MARKET 114 (2005) (“[D]espite having roughly
the same share of the vote, radical right parties were more than twice as successful in gaining
seats under PR as under majoritarian elections.” (emphasis omitted)).
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the candidate wins, but each vote she gets beyond the threshold is surplus;
and half of all votes cast are lost or surplus, wasted in the sense that they have
no impact on the outcome.68 For this reason, a party’s success depends not
only on its popularity, i.e., its statewide vote share, but also its efficiency, i.e.,
how it translates votes into seats. And efficiency depends critically on how the
party’s supporters are distributed geographically across electoral districts. So
an electoral map can interact with the underlying political geography to
distort the overall vote-seat relationship. By strategically manipulating
electoral boundaries, i.e., packing and cracking, the partisan mapmaker can
actually invert the vote-seat relationship, conferring a majority of seats on the
party with a minority of votes. Another form of vote-seat inversion, which I call
majority dominance, occurs when a party earns supermajority seat-share without
supermajority vote-share.69
This power to invert the vote-seat relationship is awesome—in the biblical
sense—and power corrupts. But AES is structurally vulnerable to distorted
vote-seat relationships, not only when partisan mapmakers wield the
districting pen, but also when political geography conspires with ostensibly
neutral districting criteria to produce unintentional gerrymandering. A
politics-blind computer algorithm, guided by traditional criteria like
contiguity, compactness, and preservation of local political boundaries, may
unintentionally pack and crack, simply because Democrats cluster in cities,
while Republicans disperse themselves in more sparsely populated rural areas.
And vote-seat distortion is just the final product, the snapshot at the end
of the electoral process. Just as important are the dynamics of the general
election cycle, as incumbents, challengers, parties, donors, and voters make
strategic choices based on anticipated electoral results. Some key aspects of
these dynamics include: (1) vote-seat responsiveness;70 (2) district competitiveness;71

68. Benjamin Plener Cover, Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of the Efficiency
Gap Proposal, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1222–32 (2018).
69. Legislative bodies generally impose supermajority requirements for significant actions,
such as overriding a gubernatorial veto, amending the state constitution, passing the budget,
raises taxes. These supermajority requirements reflect the principle that a bare majority confers
a more limited governing mandate than a substantial majority. Majority dominance subverts this
principle by conferring a supermajority on a party that lacks supermajority support.
70. How sensitive are changes in a party’s seat-share to changes in that party’s vote-share?
In other words, if a party boosts its vote share by a given increment, will its seat share increase a
lot, a little, or none at all? With high responsiveness, seat share increases a lot; with low
responsiveness, seat share increases a little; with no responsiveness, seat share doesn’t budge.
Technically, responsiveness is denoted 𝜌 and defined as the slope of the vote-seat curve at the
point of the electoral outcome, i.e., 𝜌 ≡ .
71. How competitive is each district race, i.e., how uncertain is its outcome? District
competitiveness is generally measured by the margin of victory (the vote difference between the
top two candidates) and the district is classified as competitive or safe depending on whether that
margin falls below or above some specified threshold (like five or ten percent).
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(3) uncontested races;72 (4) incumbency rate;73 (5) voter turnout;74 (6) external
efficacy.75 These concepts all interrelate. Seat share is responsive to vote share
if and only if there are competitive districts with narrow anticipated victory
margins that could plausibly flip parties with enough of a vote swing. The least
competitive district is obviously an uncontested district, and a district is more
likely to be uncontested if prospective challengers think it is uncompetitive.
Incumbency rates may be high for good reasons—an incumbent delivers for
her constituents and they reward her with another term—or for reasons
independent of the electoral map—for example, name recognition or
campaign finance rules. But uncontested or uncompetitive district races
necessarily give incumbency rates an artificial boost. While competitiveness is
negatively correlated with incumbency rate, it is positively correlated with
voter turnout and external efficacy, as rational choice theory predicts and the
empirical literature confirms.76
The 2018 Wisconsin Assembly election is most infamous for the vote-seat
inversion it produced—Republicans won 63 of 99 seats with 47 percent of the
vote. But the map’s pathologies extend beyond this ultimate result to the
dynamics that produced it. The 2018 election was a blue wave, featuring a 7.5
percent vote swing from Republicans to Democrats compared to 2016.77
Republicans won the 2016 vote share by 9 points, but lost the 2018 vote share
by 7 points.78 This represents a decisive repudiation of the party in power. But
that repudiation had virtually no effect, because it managed to flip only one
out of 99 seats.79 The Republican supermajority in the Wisconsin Assembly
plummeted from 64 out of 99 seats to 63 out of 99 seats. Consider this from
the perspective of the party in power: Win the popular vote by 9 points, and
you get a filibuster proof supermajority in the legislature, but lose the popular
vote by 7 points . . . and you get a filibuster proof supermajority in the
legislature. This non-responsiveness subverts elementary principles of
democratic theory.
This non-responsiveness was associated with uncompetitive districts. In

72. How many districts feature a single candidate running unopposed, or a single majorparty candidate opposed only by independent or third-party candidates with no realistic prospect
of winning?
73. What percentage of incumbents win reelection?
74. What percentage of a district’s eligible voters actually participate in the district election?
75. Do people believe that politicians respond to constituents, that elected officials care
about average people, that they can meaningfully participate in the democratic process?
76. André Blais & Ignacio Lago, A General Measure of District Competitiveness, 28 ELECTORAL
STUD. 94, 94 (2009) (“[P]eople are more likely to feel that their vote counts when an election is
close, and such feeling fosters turnout.”).
77. Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA [hereinafter BALLOTPEDIA,
Wisconsin State Assembly Elections], https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2018
[https://perma.cc/45DS-U3SL] (last updated Aug. 10, 2021); Schmidt, supra note 7.
78. BALLOTPEDIA, Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, supra note 77.
79. Id.
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the 2018 Assembly election, the average margin of victory in a district race
was 28.1 percent.80 Of the 99 district races, only 11 had a margin of victory
under 10 percent.81 The other 88 races weren’t even close.82 Indeed, in 33
races (precisely one third of all races) the winner ran unopposed, because
nobody else even tried to compete.83 Under AES, your vote really matters if
and only if it helps your preferred candidate win your district. Otherwise, your
vote is wasted. So if the outcome of the district race is a foregone conclusion
—and it often is—why bother voting? Or running? Safe districts yield a vicious
circle of voter apathy and party atrophy because the only way to achieve
statewide representation under AES is to win a district race.84
While the Wisconsin Assembly was impervious to the blue wave of 2018,
Democratic candidates won elections for governor and attorney general. But
consider how the Wisconsin legislature responded behind the electoral shield
of partisan gerrymandering.
[T]he outgoing Republican-controlled legislature enacted, and the
lame-duck Republican governor signed, legislation that deprived the
governor of control over significant public programs and transferred
from the attorney general to the legislature authority to withdraw
from various kinds of litigation. The legislation was apparently
intended in great measure to cripple the ability of the incoming
Democrats to deliver on their campaign pledges—the very basis,
presumably, of their election to office—thereby subverting the only
reason to hold elections in the first place.85
AES is vulnerable not just to intentional partisan gerrymandering, but to a set
of pathologies, associated with both intentional and unintentional gerrymandering,
so severe that countermandering is imperative.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Christopher Warshaw, The Impact of Partisan
Gerrymandering on Political Parties, 45 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 609 (2020) (presenting empirical evidence
of partisan gerrymandering’s adverse effects: candidates are less likely to contest districts; those
that do are weaker; donors are less willing to give money; and ordinary voters are less likely to
support the disfavored party); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (“Members of the ‘disfavored party’ in the State, deprived of their natural political
strength by a partisan gerrymander, may face difficulties fundraising, registering voters, attracting
volunteers, generating support from independents, and recruiting candidates to run for office
. . . .” (citations omitted)).
85. James A. Gardner, Illiberalism and Authoritarianism in the American States, 70 AM. U. L. REV.
829, 883 (2021) (citations omitted); see also Carolyn Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and the
Guarantee Clause, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 183, 187 (2020) (pointing out that similar conduct occurred
in Michigan and North Carolina).
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B. WHY WE NEED STRUCTURAL COUNTERMANDERING
The pathologies just described are well known, but they are often
attributed specifically to intentional partisan gerrymandering rather than to
AES itself. Under this performative framing, it is implicitly assumed that these
pathologies could be adequately constrained if only electoral boundaries were
drawn by the right mapmaker or subject to judicial scrutiny under the right
legal standard. In this section, I challenge this theory of constraint. I argue
that structural countermandering is the only viable strategy because of the
inherent limits of judicial and institutional countermandering under AES.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently dealt a significant blow to the judicial
countermandering strategy when it declared that partisan gerrymandering
claims present a non-justiciable political question that federal courts cannot
adjudicate.86 I think Rucho was wrongly decided, and I have argued elsewhere
that it should be read narrowly to foreclose only “allocative” claims of partisan
gerrymandering that frame liability and remedy in terms of the vote-seat
relationship, leaving open “non-allocative” claims like those predicated on an
electoral map’s unfair geographic impact.87 But the Court is unlikely to revisit
or distinguish Rucho in the near-term, so the federal courts cannot constrain
partisan gerrymandering directly.88 And even if the Rucho majority was
mistaken about the authority and competence of the federal courts to
adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering, it identified legitimate
prudential concerns implicated whenever any court rules on such claims.89
While Rucho closed the federal courthouse door, the state courts remain
open, and some have more specific state constitutional provisions to guide
adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims.90 But even if state judges

86. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498–508 (2019).
87. Benjamin Plener Cover, Rucho for Minimalists, 71 MERCER L. REV. 695, 704–18 (2020);
Cover & Niven, supra note 48.
88. A partisan gerrymander could still be challenged in federal court based on claims of
minority vote dilution, malapportionment, or racial gerrymandering, but not based on claims of
partisan gerrymandering. See, e.g., Perez v. Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 143–80 (W.D. Tex. 2017)
(minority vote dilution); Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207, 215–18 (5th Cir. 2015)
(malapportionment); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1268–74 (2015)
(racial gerrymandering).
89. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2515–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I’ll give the majority this one
—and important—thing: It identifies some dangers everyone should want to avoid. Judges should
not be apportioning political power based on their own vision of electoral fairness, whether
proportional representation or any other. And judges should not be striking down maps left,
right, and center, on the view that every smidgen of politics is a smidgen too much. Respect for
state legislative processes—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels
intervention in only egregious cases.”).
90. Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *108–12 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019); see also League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d
737, 803, 814–21 (Pa. 2018) (striking down Pennsylvania’s congressional map for violating
guarantees in Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 5 that “[e]lections shall be free and
equal; and no power . . . shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of
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have more to work with textually, they face similar challenges prudentially and
doctrinally. Assuming that such claims are framed in terms of vote-seat
relationships, they still ask state courts to reallocate power between the two
political parties. This raises the concerns identified by the Rucho majority:
Embroiling judges in high-stakes political contests and perceptions of judicial
bias.91 And state judges may not have the life tenure, salary protections, and
insulation from political pressures that federal judges enjoy.
Litigation is slow and expensive. Gerrymandering litigation is always a
moving target because electoral maps have limited shelf life. The state must
draw a new map every ten years to ensure population equality based on the
most recent census data.92 With elections every two years, a map is good for
five elections—at most, because states may engage in mid-cycle redistricting,
a practice the Supreme Court has explicitly approved.93
Perhaps redistricting commissions can eschew what AES invites, if states
can establish these bodies and endow them with the requisite independence,
competence, resources, composition, procedures, and substantive criteria.
But partisans don’t pass the pen willingly. They resist. They try to keep the
redistricting initiative off the ballot, and if that fails, they mobilize against its
passage.94 If it passes, they try to obstruct, or coopt, the commission, through
appointment and removal of commissioners, or by starving the commission
of resources, or through lawsuits that challenge the commission or its maps.95

suffrage” (quoting PA. CONST. art. 1, § 5)); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So.
3d 363, 375, 401–13 (Fla. 2015) (striking down Florida’s congressional map for violating the
state’s “Free Districts Amendment,” which provides that no districting plan “shall be drawn with
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party,” (quoting FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a))).
91. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (“The expansion of judicial authority would not be into just
any area of controversy, but into one of the most intensely partisan aspects of American political
life.”); id. at 2498–99 (“‘With uncertain limits, intervening courts . . . would risk assuming
political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces ill will and distrust.’” (quoting
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
92. Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” Out of Redistricting: State
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1247 (2007) (“Supreme Court
rulings of the 1960s required legislative districts to be of equal population, and thus redistricting
became a decennial obligation for the states following the release of new federal census
population data.”).
93. League of United Lat. Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006) (“With respect
to a mid-decade redistricting to change [congressional] districts drawn earlier in conformance
with a decennial census, the Constitution . . . state[s] no explicit prohibition.”); id. at 457
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Constitution places no per se ban
on mid-cycle redistricting . . . .” ).
94. Stephanopoulos, supra note 8, at 338.
95. Matt Vasilogambros, The Tumultuous Life of an Independent Redistricting Commissioner, PEW
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/
11/26/the-tumultuous-life-of-an-independent-redistricting-commissioner [https://perma.cc/
W64W-WH8Q]; Andrew C. Maxfield, Comment, Litigating the Line Drawers: Why Courts Should
Apply Anderson-Burdick to Redistricting Commissions, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (2020); Harris v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1305–06 (2016).
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And then they try to get another initiative on the ballot, this one repealing, or
capturing, the commission.96
And if redistricting commissions are to keep drawing congressional maps,
the Court itself must eschew a strong independent state legislature theory of
the Elections Clause, which provides that “[t]he Times, Places, and Manner
of . . . [federal] [e]lections . . . shall be prescribed in each [s]tate by the
[l]egislature thereof.”97 When Arizonans first established an independent
redistricting commission, the Arizona state legislature insisted that the
Elections Clause grants it alone the power to draw congressional maps. The
Court ultimately rejected that argument, but in a 5-4 decision with a strident
dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts, who accused the majority of
“gerrymander[ing] the Constitution” with an atextual reading of the
Elections Clause.98 Now that Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett have replaced
Justices Kennedy and Ginsberg, some fear (or hope) that the Court will
reverse that decision and return the power to draw congressional maps to state
legislatures.99
Judicial and institutional countermandering may constrain intentional
partisan gerrymandering to some extent, perhaps avoiding the most
egregious gerrymanders, but only at great cost. And even if they could entirely
extirpate partisan manipulation from the mapmaking process, they cannot
end unintentional gerrymandering. AES is structurally vulnerable to distorted
vote-seat relationships, not only when partisan mapmakers wield the
districting pen, but also when political geography conspires with ostensibly
neutral districting criteria to produce unintentional gerrymandering.
Massachusetts has not sent a single Republican to the House of
Representatives since 1994, even though Republican candidates regularly win
about 30 percent of votes cast in the nine Massachusetts congressional
districts. A recent analysis concluded:
[T]he underperformance of Republicans in Massachusetts is not
attributable to gerrymandering, nor to the failure of Republicans to
field House candidates, but is a structural mathematical feature of
the actual distribution of votes observable . . . . Republican votes
clear 30%, but are distributed so uniformly that they are locked out
of the possibility of representation. Though there are more ways of

96. Rudi Keller, Voters Repeal Clean Missouri Redistricting Plan They Enacted in 2018, COLUMBIA
DAILY TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.columbiatribune.com/story/news/politics/
elections/2020/11/04/voters-repeal-clean-missouri-redistricting-plan-they-enacted2018/61638
58002 [https://perma.cc/UFU2-5WZ6].
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
98. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 826 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
99. See Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State
Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 90–93 (2020); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court,
2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 152–53.
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building a valid districting plan than there are particles in the galaxy,
every single one of them would produce a 9–0 Democratic
delegation.100
As Justice Scalia put it in the Vieth plurality opinion:
[W]e would find it impossible to ensure that [the majority] party
wins a majority of seats—unless we radically revise the States’
traditional structure for elections. In any winner-take-all district
system, there can be no guarantee, no matter how the district lines
are drawn, that a majority of party votes statewide will produce a
majority of seats for that party.101
Recall that Seifter recently found 267 cases between 1968 and 2016
where a party captured a state legislative chamber with minority vote share.102
Performative countermandering could have prevented each of these reversals
only if intentional partisan gerrymandering producer each one, and only if
performative countermandering could have prevented each such instance of
intentional partisan gerrymandering.
More generally, AES itself produces the pathologies that a performative
theory attributes to bad actors. Intentional gerrymandering may exacerbate
them, but they can happen even without intentional gerrymandering. There
is robust debate about what role intentional gerrymandering plays exactly, but
there are strong indications that these pathologies are at least partially
attributable to the system itself.103
Even if judicial or institutional countermandering succeeds in preventing
both intentional and unintentional vote-seat distortions, the results may be a
bipartisan gerrymander that carves up the state into the desired number of

100. Moon Duchin et al., Locating the Representational Baseline: Republicans in Massachusetts, 18
ELECTION L.J. 388, 388 (2019).
101. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 289 (2004).
102. Seifter, supra note 9 (manuscript at 26–32). This statistic refers only to minority-majority
vote-seat inversions, where a party wins a majority of seats with a strict minority (i.e., not even a
plurality) of votes. But support for third party or independent candidates could produce a
plurality-majority vote-seat inversion, where a party wins a majority of seats with a plurality, but
not a majority, of votes. Over the same period, plurality-majority vote-seat inversion has occurred
68 times, 35 for state upper chambers and 33 for state lower chambers. Thus, vote-seat inversion
of either the minority-majority or plurality-majority variety has occurred 335 times, at least once
in 40 states, 181 for state upper chambers and 154 for state lower chambers. Id.
103. See, e.g., Peter Selb, A Deeper Look at the Proportionality-Turnout Nexus, 42 COMPAR. POL.
STUD. 527, 527 (2009) (“Evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation
(PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming . . . it is argued that majoritarian electoral
systems tend to produce safe seats and that voters have little incentive to turn out there. Thus,
uneven turnout over electoral districts due to variable intensities of local competition is made
responsible for the lower overall turnout. . . . This article scrutinizes the relationship between
electoral rules, competition, and turnout with district-level data from 31 national elections.
Results from a heteroscedastic model indicate that lower net turnout in majoritarian systems is indeed
a consequence of uneven turnout over districts due to variable levels of local competitiveness.”).
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safe red and safe blue districts, sacrificing principles of geographic
representation to produce partisan fairness. Such bipartisan gerrymanders
diminish responsiveness by creating many uncompetitive districts, and
thereby producing many races that are uncontested, only lightly contested, or
otherwise a foregone conclusion. And when the electoral map pre-ordains the
outcome, participation in the general election may seem pointless, the vain
ritual of a faux democracy. The result is low voter turnout and reduced
external efficacy. The action naturally shifts from the general election to the
primary election, so the ideology of the district representative shifts from that
of the median general election voter to that of the median primary election
voter.104 The result may be a legislature more ideologically polarized than the
electorate.
Performative countermandering could affirmatively demand fair
partisan outcomes, rather than just the absence of discriminatory partisan
intent.105 But to achieve partisan fairness, mapmakers may have to
subordinate other important districting goals, like capturing communities of
interest or drawing competitive districts. AES itself produces the pathologies
often attributed exclusively to intentional partisan gerrymandering. If we can
overcome all the barriers to successful judicial and institutional
countermandering, we may curb the worst vote-seat distortions, but only at
great cost, and the other pathologies will persist, if not worsen.
C. WHY WE NEED TWO-PARTY STRUCTURAL COUNTERMANDERING
The prior Section argued that structural countermandering presents the
only viable response to gerrymandering because AES will confound any nonstructural countermandering strategy. This section argues that the only viable
way to achieve structural countermandering is to preserve the two-party
system, because the two-party system will resist any reform that threatens it.
Note that I make a predictive claim about the two-party system’s
entrenchment, not a normative claim about its superiority. My personal view
is that there are strong arguments for and against the two-party system, and
the question merits vigorous debate.106 But in this Article, I make no attempt

104. Jonathan S. Gould, The Law of Legislative Representation, 107 VA. L. REV. 765, 795 (2021)
(“The need to win primaries leads legislative candidates to position themselves closer to more
extreme primary voters, rather than to more moderate general-election voters. The result is that
Republican legislators are well to their median constituent’s right and Democratic legislators are
well to their median constituent’s left.”footnotes omitted); David W. Brady, Hahrie Han & Jeremy
C. Pope, Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step With the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 79, 82 (2007); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 308 (2011).
105. John F. Nagle & Alec Ramsay, On Measuring Two-Party Partisan Bias in Unbalanced
States, 20 ELECTION L.J. 116, 117 (2021) (“If there is such systemic bias, there may still be plans
that are outliers in the ensemble that are nonetheless fair, and we believe a redistricting
commission should adopt such a plan rather than an average plan.”).
106. See supra Section II.A.4.
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to resolve this debate. I only argue that any reform effort that threatens the
two-party system will face steep, and possibly insurmountable, resistance. One
may not like the two-party system, and for good reason. But the two-party
system likes the two-party system quite a bit. It is hard to take on the two-party
system, especially when there is no consensus against it. Serious efforts to
address gerrymandering must take this reality into account.
For example, the Dutch list proportional representation system is
logically immune from gerrymandering because there are no electoral
boundaries to manipulate. Theoretically, the United States could eliminate
gerrymandering entirely by simply replacing the prevailing electoral system
with the Dutch system, much like the Dutch did themselves after World War
I. But as a practical matter, this is a non-starter. This intuition can be
translated into a more general hypothesis: the two-party system will defeat any
proposal for an alternative electoral schema that immediately threatens the
two-party system. This hypothesis consists of a few related claims:
(1) Most proposals to reform AES would shift the United States from a
two-party system with legislative majoritarianism to a multiparty
system with inter-party governing coalitions, or at least people so
predict; and
(2) Whatever its benefits, multiparty governing coalitions would involve
drawbacks—fringe parties, extremists, unstable coalitions, snap
elections, gridlock, lack of accountability, and so forth, or at least
people so predict; and
(3) Given (1) and (2), party elites empowered by the status quo will
perceive these proposals as a threat to the status quo that empowers
them, no matter what’s best for the polity, or what effects these
proposals would actually have; and
(4) Given (1) and (2), party elites can effectively attack and successfully
defeat these proposals.
One alternative schema that has garnered considerable attention and
support is one based on multi-member districts, with three to five
representatives per district, and seat allocation based on a single-transferrable
vote. This is a multi-seat version of the sort of ranked-choice voting (“RCV”)
approach that has enjoyed so much success recently in the single-seat context.
The national advocacy group FairVote has endorsed this approach.
Representative Don Beyer (D-VA) introduced a bill, called the Fair
Representation Act (“FRA”), to adopt this system for congressional
elections.107 Recently, legal scholar Paul Diller has proposed mini-FRAs for
state legislatures.108
Another option is the Open List Proportional Representation variation

107. Fair Representation Act, H.R. 4000, 116th Cong. (2019).
108. Paul Diller, Making State Democracy More Representative (draft manuscript on file with
author).
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endorsed by political scientists Jack Santucci and Matthew Shugart for the
U.S. House.109 Like the FRA, Open List Proportional Representation would
use multi-member districts with three to five members per district. But voters
would choose a single candidate, rather than ranking all candidates. That vote
would be treated as a vote both for the candidate and for her party. Seats
would be allocated to parties based on some allocation formula to achieve
proportionality. Each party’s seats would then go to the most popular
candidates affiliated with that party.110 Santucci and Shugart favor Open List
Proportional Representation because it is “minimally disruptive” in an
administrative sense—just like they now do under AES, each voter would
simply pick her favorite candidate and election officials would simply count
up the votes and report the totals.111
Another option is the MMP system used successfully for decades in
Germany and New Zealand.112 Each country implements its own variation, but
the essential features are the same: the legislative body is divided into two tiers:
a nominal (i.e., person) tier and a list (i.e., party) tier. Each voter gets two
votes, one for each tier. An electoral map partitions the state into single-seat
districts for the nominal tier, and each district seat goes to the individual
candidate most popular with her district’s voters. But MMP allocates the listtier seats statewide to political parties to achieve overall proportionality
between the vote share and seat share of each party. MMP is “mixed-member”
because it uses different election methods for different members of the
legislative body. MMP is “proportional” because list seat allocation
compensates for nominal seat allocation to produce overall proportionality
for each party. This system retains the personal, geographic representation of
the U.S. system but avoids the problem of gerrymandering and associated
pathologies. Its success in Germany and New Zealand has understandably
impressed academics and reformers worldwide.113 Despite its popularity
109. Jack Santucci, A Modest and Timely Proposal, VOTEGUY.COM (Dec. 9, 2020), https://
www.voteguy.com/2020/12/09/a-modest-and-timely-proposal [https://perma.cc/CK7D-WGDM];
Matthew S. Shugart, Emergency Electoral Reform: OLPR for the US House, FRUITS & VOTES (Jan. 19,
2021), https://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/2021/01/19/emergency-electoral-reform-olpr-forthe-us-house [https://perma.cc/6AD8-JZLN ].
110. For example, assume there are five district seats, and five candidates run from each
major party. Suppose Republican candidates collectively earn 60 percent of the votes cast while
Democratic candidates collectively earn the remaining 40 percent. The five seats would be
allocated among the parties proportional to their relative vote share, so Republicans would get
three seats and Democrats would get the other two. The three Republican seats would go to the
three Republican candidates who earned the most votes out of all the Republican candidates.
The two Democratic seats would go to the two Democratic candidates who earned the most votes
out of all the Democratic candidates.
111.
Shugart, supra note 109; see Santucci, supra note 109.
112. See generally MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, MIXED-MEMBER
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS? (2003) (analyzing major countries that have
adopted mixed-member systems).
113. See generally Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell & Robin T. Pettitt, Expert Opinion on Electoral
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elsewhere, MMP has received very little attention in the United States.
The FPA, Open List Proportional Representation, and MMP are all
serious proposals that offer compelling advantages over AES. But each one
would shift the United States from a two-party system with legislative
majoritarianism (i.e., a single party controls a majority of seats in the
legislative body) to a multiparty system with inter-party governing coalitions,
or at least people so predict.
FairVote published a report assessing the likely impact of the FPA.114 This
report noted that increasing district magnitude decreases the threshold vote
share needed to win a seat: “the threshold would be just over a third of the
vote in two-winner districts, just over a fourth of the vote in three-winner
districts, just over a fifth of the vote in four-winner districts, and just over a
sixth of the vote in five-winner districts.”115 FairVote predicted that this lower
threshold would help third party candidates win seats.
[I]n nearly all districts, any faction of voters that make up more than
17 or 25% of the electorate will be able to elect a candidate of their
choosing. As less doctrinaire voters are as numerous as partisan
Democrats and Republicans in the general election electorate,
ranked choice voting would allow them to come together to elect
more representatives able to act as bridge builders in districts across
the country, and open the door for independent and third party
candidates that may better represent their views.116
Some favor the FPA in part precisely because they predict it will foster
multiparty democracy.117 FairVote asked 14 political scientists to assess 37
structural reforms based on 16 different criteria.118 Two of the highest-rated
reforms, called RCV-3 and RCV-5, were essentially variations of the FPA with
different district magnitudes. FairVote reported, “a consensus that using RCV
in three- and five- seat districts would provide serious potential for more third
parties . . . to hold traditional major party candidates accountable and
potentially win seats.”119 Open List Proportional Representation similarly
threatens the two-party system, because it also increases district magnitude

Systems: So Which Electoral System is “Best”?, 15 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OP. & PARTIES 3 (2005)
(discussing responses to an electoral system survey).
114. See generally FAIRVOTE, THE FAIR REPRESENTATION ACT: REMEDYING DYSFUNCTION IN THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2017) [hereinafter FAIRVOTE, THE FAIR REPRESENTATION ACT],
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/FairRepActReport [https://perma.cc/P93Q-TDHN] (analyzing
the Fair Representation Act’s impact on competition and partisan fairness).
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 20.
117. DRUTMAN, supra note 66, at 206–39.
118. FAIRVOTE, COMPARATIVE STRUCTURAL REFORM: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 37 STRUCTURAL
REFORMS 4 (2016), https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/comparative-structural-reform [https://
perma.cc/9ZLB-MDYK].
119. Id. at 13.
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and thus decreases the vote share threshold needed to win a seat.120 MMP also
promotes multiparty democracy: in New Zealand, five parties win seats; in
Germany, six parties win seats.121 To be sure, some think these proposals
would have little impact on the two-party system.122 But the question is what
party elites will fear, not whether those fears are justified. Even if their fears
are overblown, party elites are likely to perceive proposals such as these as
threats to the two-party system.
Threatened by these proposals, party elites will likely mobilize against
them. They will follow a familiar script, warning voters that any step towards a
more proportional multiparty democracy is a slippery slope to the worst
possible political dysfunction.123 The script will conflate different electoral
systems and offer a simplistic institutional determinism, blaming proportional
representation for: the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazi
party;124 Ukraine’s failure to stop Crimea’s annexation;125 Israel’s recent

120. Shugart, supra note 109 (“Basically, the point is that there are (at least) two ‘rights’ and
two ‘lefts’ but currently only one party on the right and one on the left. . . . The need for PR is to
let the free-market small-d democrats in the currently existing parties act independently of their
more extreme wings. This is precisely what PR systems permit–each side’s extreme can be its own
party rather than a wing of one majority-seeking party, without raising concerns over ‘spoilers’
that arise under plurality elections. . . . I also am not going to go into the details of how actual
coalitions would work under this stylized latent four-party system that PR would allow to break
forth.” (footnotes omitted)); Ingraham, supra note 66 (“But an interesting thing about multimember districts, according to political scientists, is that they could usher in the end of two-party
politics. . . . Multi-member districts would, almost by definition, fracture the Democratic and
Republican parties.”).
121. What About “Fringe Parties”?, F AIR VOTE CAN., https://www.fairvote.ca/factcheck
fringeparties [https://perma.cc/5RQR-YW2P] (last updated Aug. 17, 2021).
122. Santucci, supra note 109 (“Get over the allergy to third-party politics. Take a serious
look at what states and districts are likely to produce third-party winners. Others may disagree
with me, but I suspect gains would be isolated and modest.”).
123.
In some cases, reform opponents may use a literal script. To take but one illustrative
example, consider the media campaign of the No BC Proportional Representation Society, the
official opponent group for the electoral reform proposal on the 2018 British Columbia
referendum ballot. About Us, VOTE NO TO PRO REP, https://nobcprorep.ca/about-us [https://
perma.cc/4FBP-CRXH] (last updated Aug. 17, 2021). According to the group’s founder, “[t]he
most prominent ad showed scenes from Europe talking about the problems of extremism under
proportional representation, ending with marching soldiers and the sound of their boots – and
it hit a major nerve.” Bill Tieleman, How the No Side Surged From Behind to Defeat Proportional
Representation, VANCOUVER SUN (Feb. 21, 2019), https://vancouversun.com/opinion/op-ed/howthe-no-side-surged-from-behind-to-defeat-proportional-representation [https://perma.cc/VE3UKW5B]. The ad is available at: Vancouver Sun, Proportional Representation: Pros and Cons of
Reforming B.C.’s Electoral System, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tuh2bJapng [https://perma.cc/JNS8-WQ9R].
124. See generally F.A. HERMENS, DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY? A STUDY OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION (1941) (discussing how the proportional representation helped the Nazi party
gain power).
125. Serhij Vasylchenko, The Negative Consequences of Proportional Representation in Ukraine, 21
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 425, 447–48 (2013).
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parliamentary election, its fourth snap election in two years;126 and other
cautionary tales of political dysfunction.127 These attacks may resonate in a
political environment that has long evinced a deep hostility to proportional
representation.128
For these reasons, I fear these proposals fail the “here to there” test. AES
produces intolerable pathologies, but any proposal for an alternative schema
will fail if it immediately threatens the two-party system. This dilemma begs
the question: is there an electoral schema that avoids gerrymandering and its
associated pathologies, but retains both personal, geographic representation
and biparty legislative majoritarianism? The next Part proposes an electoral
schema designed to do just that.
III. THE PROPOSAL: HOW TO ACHIEVE TWO-PARTY
STRUCTURAL COUNTERMANDERING
In this Part, I develop a proposal for an electoral schema that addresses
gerrymandering structurally within the confines of the two-party system. I call
this proposed schema Mixed-Member Top-Two Proportional (“MM2”),
because it operates much like the traditional Mixed-Member Proportional
(“MMP”) described above129 but replaces the broader form of proportionality
used in MMP with a narrower form of two-party proportionality.
Like MMP, MM2 preserves personal, geographic representation by
126. Jeffrey Heller, Netanyahu Alleges Israeli Election Fraud, Accuses Rival of Duplicity, REUTERS
(June 6, 2021, 8:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-allegeselection-fraud-accuses-rival-duplicity-2021-06-06 [https://perma.cc/NY52-RHRU].
127. Quentin L. Quade, Debate—Proportional Representation: PR and Democratic Statecraft,2 J.
DEMOCRACY 36, 36–38 (1991) (“[T]he obvious and dramatic cases in which PR clearly
contributed to governmental weakness and systemic collapse[:] Pre-Mussolini Italy, with its
splintered parties and political gridlock, would be a worthy example. France’s Fourth Republic
(1945-1958), chronically crippled and finally made suicidal by its inability to deal with colonial
and domestic problems, would be another. Finally, the Weimar Republic, where coalition was
endemic and weakness perpetual, might be the best of all test cases for PR.”); Bill Tieleman, No
BC Proportional Representation Society Brings Together Political Opponents to Fight Pro-Rep in BC Fall
Referendum, BLOGSPOT.COM (Jan. 14, 2018, 5:41 PM), https://billtieleman.blogspot.com/
2018/01/no-bc-proportional-representation.html [https://perma.cc/8CFB-9QQ7] (“We have our
work cut out for us to defeat proportional representation and not end up like Italy, Israel, Austria
or other countries where the electoral system promotes extremists and damages democracy.”).
128. After withering attacks by Senate Republicans, President Bill Clinton withdrew his
nomination of Lani Guinier to lead the civil rights division of the Department of Justice, citing
her scholarship critiquing the two-party system and advocating proportional representation. Text
of President Clinton’s Comments on Withdrawal of Guinier Nomination, WASH. POST (June 4, 1993),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/06/04/text-of-president-clintonscomments-on-withdrawal-of-guinier-nomination/253b93a3-ca1f-4a6b-b164-67a30749b765 [https://
perma.cc/9CFK-FYHL]; see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018) (“Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.” (emphasis omitted)). See generally Sanford Levinson,
Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away, 33
UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985) (analyzing the merits and demerits of proportional representation).
129. See supra Section II.C.
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selecting most legislators through single-seat districts and it implements
structural countermandering by allocating additional seats to political parties
to compensate for any vote-seat distortion these districted elections produce.
But whereas MMP allocates these seats to achieve vote-seat proportionality for
every party, MM2 allocates these seats to achieve vote-seat proportionality only
for the top two parties.
For example, suppose parties A, B, and C respectively win 48 percent, 46
percent, and 6 percent of the statewide popular vote in all single-seat district
elections. Under the current schema, given partisan gerrymandering or other
factors, party B might win a majority of these districts even though party A
candidates earned more votes. Under traditional MMP, additional seats would
be allocated to the political parties so that parties A, B, and C respectively win
roughly 48 percent, 46 percent, and 6 percent of overall seats. By producing
vote-seat proportionality for each party, traditional MMP countermands the
effect of partisan gerrymandering, but it produces a three-party legislature
with no legislative majority. Under MM2, additional seats would be allocated
to the political parties so that parties A and B respectively win seat shares
roughly proportional to their relative two-party vote shares. So party A seat
share would be 51 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
and party B seat share would be 49 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
. By producing vote-seat proportionality only for the top two parties,
MM2 also countermands the effect of partisan gerrymandering, but it
produces a two-party legislature with a single-party legislative majority.
Just like AES, MM2 is not a single electoral system but rather an electoral
schema, a family of electoral systems that share common motivations,
structural components, and effects. The common structural components
include: dividing the legislative body into two classes, a nominal class and a
list class; partitioning the state into electoral districts, assigning nominal seats
to districts, and awarding those seats to the candidates district voters prefer to
represent them; and the most important component of all, a structural
countermandering principle that automatically allocates list seats to the top
two political parties based on their relative popularity.
But there is more than one way to do MM2, and implementation entails
important design questions. These questions include: the overall size of the
legislative body and the relative size of the two classes; whether the ballot
should ask voters only which candidates they prefer to represent their
districts, or also which political parties they prefer overall; for each question,
whether the voter should select their top choice or rank all the options; and
how precisely election administrators should aggregate voter responses to
determine election results. Section B canvasses these design questions in detail.
But before Section B’s deep dive into design details, Section A presents
the case for MM2 using a simplified version to demonstrate its operation and
illustrate its primary benefits.
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A. THE CONCEPT
1. The Proposal in Brief

To see how MM2 works, let’s consider a real-world example. The
Wisconsin Assembly has 99 seats, each assigned to a single-seat district. After
gaining power in 2010 and passing an egregious partisan gerrymander,130
Republicans consistently earned disproportionate seat share throughout the
2010 redistricting cycle, twice securing majority seat share with minority vote
share:
Table 1:131 Wisconsin State Assembly Election Results
Vote Share Versus Seat Share Under the Post-2010 Map
Year
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020

Vote Share (R-D)
48.6%–51.4%
52.0%–48.0%
54.5%–45.5%
47.0%–53.0%
54.5%–45.5%

Seat Share (R-D)
60.6%–39.4%
63.6%–36.4%
64.6%–35.4%
63.6%–36.4%
61.6%–38.4%

The most extreme election occurred in 2018, when Republicans won 63
of 99 seats with just 47 percent of the votes, while Democrats won just 36 of
99 seats with 53 percent of the votes.
Let’s consider a simplified analysis of what would have happened in 2018
with MM2. This analysis is simplified in two respects. First, I will use the most
stripped-down version of MM2, where each voters gets one vote, and the
countermandering principle is implemented in the simplest way. Second, for
the purpose of this example, I use the real election data from 2018. Of course,
voters, candidates, parties, and other electoral actors (like mapmakers)
behave strategically based on the rules of the game; if we change the rules,
everyone will change their behavior accordingly. So if Wisconsin had actually
adopted MM2 shortly before the 2018 election, we would not expect the same
election results. Candidates may have made different decisions about whether
and how to run. Voters may have made different decisions about whether and
how to vote. Below, I will discuss these possible behavioral changes, and argue
that MM2 would promote desirable behavior.132 But for the present example
I necessarily assume away all these dynamic effects and simply work with real
election data from 2018.
With these caveats in mind, consider a counterfactual 2018 Wisconsin
Assembly election under MM2. In the real 2018 election, the Wisconsin
Assembly has 99 seats and the Wisconsin Assembly map consisted of 99 singleseat districts. Suppose Wisconsin had implemented MM2 by keeping those 99

130. A three-judge federal panel struck down this map as a partisan gerrymander, but the
Supreme Court reversed on standing grounds in Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018).
131. Schmidt, supra note 7.
132. See infra Section III.A.3.
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seats as nominal seats but adding 40 list seats for a total of 139 seats overall.
(Note that an odd number of seats facilitates legislative majoritarianism by
excluding the possibility of an even partisan split.) We now have a legislative
body with two classes—one nominal, one list.
Since a primary objective of MM2 is to preserve and enhance personal,
geographic representation, the nominal class would operate much like the
prevailing approach today. A mapmaker partitions the state into single-seat
districts guided by geographic criteria designed to establish meaningful placebased relationships between each district representative and the geographic
community she represents. Each district chooses its representative through a
traditional election with district residency requirements for voters and
candidates. As we shall see, countermandering can neutralize gerrymandering
independent of the electoral map, so MM2 does not specify who draws the
map or how they draw it.133 To keep things simple, let us suppose that in our
counterfactual 2018 election, Wisconsin used the same Assembly map actually
used in the real 2018 election. And let us assume that all actors behave in this
counterfactual 2018 election just as they actually did in the real 2018 election.
This means we get precisely the same lopsided results in the districted
elections: Republicans win 63 of 99 nominal seats with just 47 percent of the
votes; Democrats win just 36 of 99 nominal seats with 53 percent of the votes.
Partisan gerrymandering produces severe vote-seat distortion in the nominal
class.
After election officials determine the results of all the single-seat district
elections, the countermandering provision kicks in and automatically
allocates list seats to achieve overall biproportionality. Here, the system would
automatically neutralize the vote-seat distortion in the nominal class through
compensatory allocation of the 40 list seats, awarding 37 list seats to the
Democratic party and the remaining 3 list seats to the Republican party. This
compensatory allocation would result in 73 seats for the Democrats (36
nominal plus 37 list) and 66 seats for the Republicans (63 nominal plus 3
list). Overall, Democrats would have earned 52.5 percent seat share (73 out
of 139 seats) with 53 percent vote share, while Republicans would have earned
47.5 percent seat share (66 out of 139 seats) with 47 percent. Thus, with a list
class less than half the size of the nominal class, MM2 can achieve near-perfect
overall vote-seat bi-proportionality even with one of the most egregious
partisan gerrymanders of the 2010 redistricting cycle.

133. If the state decreases the size of the nominal class, it must draw a new electoral map with
a smaller number of larger single-seat electoral districts. If the state preserves the size of the
nominal class and expands the body, it also preserves the number of single-seat electoral districts.
With this latter approach, the state could even adopt MM2 while keeping the same electoral map
it used pre-adoption.
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Table 2: Counterfactual 2018 Wisconsin Assembly Election with MM2

Votes
Vote Share
Nominal Seats
Nominal Seat Share
List Seats
List Seat Share
Overall Seats
Overall Seat Share

Republicans
1,163,250
47.0%
63 of 99
63.6%
3 of 40
9.8%
66 of 139
47.5%

Democrats
1,311,750
53.0%
36 of 99
36.4%
37 of 40
90.2%
73 of 139
52.5%

2. Legality
Can a state replace AES with MM2? Absolutely. MM2 is the natural
response to Rucho, and the proposal’s legality is the logical implication of
Rucho. The decision is sometimes characterized as an endorsement of the
status quo, of partisan gerrymandering, and of AES. But, on its own terms,
Rucho endorses state autonomy and judicial restraint, not partisan
gerrymandering or the prevailing electoral schema. The Rucho majority
acknowledged, “[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results that
reasonably seem unjust. . . . [S]uch gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with
democratic principles.’”134 More generally, a central premise of the Rucho
decision is that the choice of an electoral system, the definition of political
fairness, and the determination of a normative baseline for seat allocation
presents “questions that are political, not legal.”135
There are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution
for making such judgments, let alone limited and precise
standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral.
Any judicial decision on what is “fair” in this context would
be an “unmoored determination” of the sort characteristic of
a political question beyond the competence of the federal
courts.136
Indeed, the U.S. Constitution neither mandates nor proscribes any
electoral schema. For congressional elections, the Election Clause, Article I,
Section 4, leaves it to each State to prescribe their “Time, Place, and Manner,”
subject to congressional regulation.137 The Constitution says nothing about
state elections, except that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
[s]tate in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”138 According to
134. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (quoting Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015)).
135. Id. at 2500.
136. Id. (citing Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
137.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
138. Id. art. 4, § 4. There is a serious argument that the Republican guarantee prohibits AES,
with its vulnerability to partisan gerrymandering, and its tendency to invert the relationship

A2_COVER_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/17/2021 8:34 PM

TWO-PARTY STRUCTURAL COUNTERMANDERING

97

Rucho, with this limited textual guidance, the federal courts cannot determine
fairness and proscribe partisan gerrymandering. But states can. “Our
conclusion does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering. Nor does
our conclusion condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void. The
States, for example, are actively addressing the issue on a number of fronts.”139
And states are not limited to judicial or institutional countermandering.
Unlike the federal courts, the states can engage in structural
countermandering, mandate biproportionality, establish the “norm” that the
top two parties “should enjoy [power] commensurate” with their popularity,
and adopt a new “electoral system” based on this norm.140
Of course, all state action is constrained by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, but MM2 accords symmetric treatment to the top two parties.
Indeed, MM2 embodies the principle of partisan symmetry that featured so
prominently in efforts to establish a federal constitutional standard to
adjudicate partisan gerrymandering.141 MM2 accords parties disparate
treatment based on their popularity, but this disparate treatment is justified
by the state’s legitimate interest in preserving bipartyism and legislative
majoritarianism. American courts have repeatedly sustained electoral laws
that accord disparate treatment based on a party’s popularity, such as ballot
access rules that distinguish between major and minor parties, as permissible
efforts to promote an electoral system that is stable, efficient, and administrable.142
Finally, adoption of MM2 would not violate the Voting Rights Act, even
though it may affect the number of nominal seats or the size of electoral
districts. The Court has held that the size of a governmental body is not
subject to a claim of racial vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act because “there is no objective and workable standard for choosing a
reasonable benchmark.”143
between votes and seats (and between voters and politicians). There is no serious argument that
the Republican guarantee requires AES.
139. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507; see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 1156 (1993)
(“[T]he federal courts may not order the creation of majority-minority districts unless necessary
to remedy a violation of federal law. But that does not mean that the State’s powers are similarly
limited.” (citation omitted)).
140. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (“Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that
groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political
power and influence. . . . But such a claim is based on a ‘norm that does not exist’ in our electoral
system—‘statewide elections for representatives along party lines.’” (quoting Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 159 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
141. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test
for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 3 (2007) (offering a “social
science perspective” on partisan gerrymandering).
142. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369–70 (1997).
143. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 (1994); see Richard Briffault, Race and Representation
After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 65 (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the
size of an elected body cannot be treated as a standard, practice, or procedure dilutive of voting
rights under Section 2.”); see also Gardner, supra note 48, at 590 (expressing doubt “that Section
2 would even apply to a state’s choice to adopt a representation system of fixed districts where”
the size of the legislature varies each election cycle).
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3. Benefits
i.

Structural Countermandering

The Wisconsin Assembly map used in 2018 is widely considered an
extreme partisan gerrymander, an outlier across states and over time.
Litigants spent years in federal court trying to undo it, and successfully
persuaded a three-judge panel of its unconstitutionality, but the Supreme
Court in Rucho foreclosed federal judicial intervention. MM2 could have
undone this partisan gerrymander in an instant, without establishing a
commission or instituting litigation, not by changing the map, but by
countermandering any distortion it produces. Note that the allocation of list
seats would happen automatically according to a simple formula codified in
state law. The “countermandering” provision would say something like: “The
list seats shall be allocated to the top two parties so as to produce the closest possible
correspondence between the statewide vote share and overall seat share of each of the top
two parties.” No person or body would exercise discretionary judgment ex post
regarding the appropriate allocation of list seats. The state’s chief election
officer would simply apply the provision after all ballot tallies had been
certified. And everyone would know ex ante how the provision will operate.
This system renders partisan gerrymandering structurally impossible. As
long as there are enough list seats to countermand any seats-votes distortion
in the nominal seats, the system will produce the desired relationship between
vote share and overall seat share. The countermanding effect occurs
automatically by the ex-ante rules of seat allocation. It requires no litigation
and no legal standard for partisan gerrymandering. It does not depend on the
good faith of the mapmaker. The mapmaker can try as she pleases: draw the
most grotesque districts, pack and crack to your heart’s content. You may
succeed in distorting the seats-votes relationship for the nominal class. But
then the system will allocate list seats accordingly. And the result will be a
legislative chamber with a partisan composition that reflects the top two
parties’ overall popularity in the electorate. The system is simply impervious
to gerrymandering. Any attempt to gerrymander would obviously be an
exercise in futility.
While the system stops the sort of intentional gerrymandering courts
could potentially address, it also countermands the sort of unintentional
gerrymandering beyond the reach of any intent-based legal standard.
Democrats may cluster in cities, while Republicans spread out in more
sparsely populated rural areas.144 The mapmaker may apply geographic
districting criteria that tend to produce seats-votes distortions, like compactness
or preservation of local political subdivisions.145 If these conditions combine
to favor one party in the allocation of nominal seats, the system will automatically
favor the other party in the allocation of list seats to achieve overall two-party
fairness in the partisan composition of the legislative chamber.

144.
145.

Chen & Rodden, supra note 15, at 241.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500.
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The system may do more than eliminate the possibility of intentional or
unintentional gerrymandering. It may deter intentional gerrymandering. As
discussed supra, a partisan gerrymander can favor one party in the allocation
of nominal seats, but the system will automatically allocate list seats
accordingly to produce a fair overall allocation. For this reason, the partisan
mapmaker cannot use gerrymandering techniques to help her party overall.
As an initial matter, gerrymandering is politically unpopular and entails some
reputational costs. Partisans gerrymander despite these costs because the
political benefits outweigh them. But if gerrymandering has no benefits, why
entail the reputational costs? Moreover, such techniques may actually hurt her
party overall if a list seat is more desirable than a nominal seat. By favoring
her party in the allocation of nominal seats, the partisan mapmaker’s
gerrymandering techniques necessarily disfavor her party in the allocation of
list seats. Gerrymandering does not win your party more seats. It just swaps
your list seats for nominal seats.
There are good reasons to think that a party would prefer a list seat to a
nominal one. By design, a nominal legislator cannot focus exclusively on
furthering her party’s legislative agenda. She is accountable to a geographic
constituency whose interests may sometimes be opposed to, or orthogonal to,
her party’s legislative agenda. She must perform constituent services. She
must dedicate resources (including time and focus) to ascertaining local
needs and representing those needs in the capital. In contrast, a list legislator
can focus exclusively on her party’s legislative agenda. Her mandate comes
from the statewide electorate, not a geographic community with particular
place-based needs. She does not have to consider how her work impacts her
district because she has no district. She has a party platform she was elected
to enact, not a local constituency she was elected to represent. For similar
reasons, we may expect list legislators to assume leadership roles in the
legislative assembly, such as the speaker and majority whip. Given the
reputational costs of gerrymandering and the likelihood that list legislators
are better situated to lead the party and further its agenda, a partisan
mapmaker under this new system has strong incentives to avoid partisan
gerrymandering.
ii. Enhancing Geographic Representation
MM2 not only preserves, but actually enhances, personal geographic
representation—for at least two reasons, and possibly three. First, without the
temptation of partisan gerrymandering, the mapmaker may draw a map that
makes more sense geographically and thus better aligns with principles of
personal, geographic representation. Second, MM2 enables a division of
labor between nominal and list legislators. List legislators, with no local
constituency, can focus more on policy, committee work, legislative oversight,
gubernatorial nominations, and so forth. Nominal legislators can focus more
on the local aspect of their work—constituent services and representing local
interests. Third, in the two-vote version of MM2, each voter answers two
questions: (1) which candidate do you prefer to represent your district; and
(2) which party do you prefer overall? This ballot structure facilitates ticket
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splitting by class, i.e., a voter can support one party overall, but support an
individual candidate from another party. This means that an individual
candidate can win support from voters who might prefer the other party
overall. “You may not agree with me on every issue, but you trust me to represent our
community, because I understand local needs and values, and I deliver for my
constituents.” This dynamic may further enhance the benefits associated with
personal, geographic representation.
iii. General Election Dynamics
AES aggregates ballots for one purpose: to choose each district’s
representative. Under this schema, the only way to influence the overall
partisan composition of the legislative body is to flip a seat in a competitive
district. But most voters live in an uncompetitive district, if the race is
contested at all. And everyone knows this when they decide whether to vote,
to donate to a campaign, to run for office, or how to allocate a political party’s
scare resources.
MM2 alters this logic. No matter how it’s implemented, MM2 aggregates
ballots for two distinct purposes: to choose each district’s representative and
to allocate list seats. Even if a voter’s preferred candidate loses the district
election, her ballot is accorded equal weight when determining the relative
popularity of the top two parties. If you vote for the Republican, you
meaningfully support the Republican party even if a Democrat wins the
district. A one-point swing in statewide party support produces a one-point
swing in overall seat share, and a 15-point vote swing produces a 15-point seat
swing—even if the state is carved up into blue and red districts so safe that a
not a single nominal seat flips. This gives a powerful incentive to vote, and to
run for district representative, even in the safest district.
The incentive is even stronger when voters are given two votes, one for a
representative, one for a party. In the two-vote versions of MM2, a voter can
support a party even if she prefers not to support that party’s candidate in the
district race, or even if that party has no candidate running in the district. And
the incentive is strongest when voters can rank their preferences over
candidates and parties. In the two-vote, ranked preferences version of MM2,
even voters who support third parties, third party candidates, or independent
candidates can also express a preference between the top two parties, and that
preference will be accorded equal weight in determining the overall partisan
composition of the legislative body.
This altered logic may turn a vicious cycle into a virtuous one,
synergistically promoting vote-seat responsiveness and district competitiveness,
voter turnout and external efficacy, party mobilization and donor investment,
strong challengers and robust campaigns. MM2 can promote all these
desirable effects even with a highly uncompetitive map.
But MM2 may also promote a more competitive map. As discussed in
Section III.A.3.i, structural countermandering renders partisan
gerrymandering futile, if not affirmatively counterproductive. While it
eliminates the incentives for partisan gerrymandering, it also obviates the
need for bipartisan gerrymandering. And while bipartisan gerrymandering
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can only achieve partisan fairness through safe districts, MM2 can achieve
partisan fairness with competitive districts.
Imagine a perfect swing state where each party enjoys half the vote share.
Suppose the mapmaker draws perfectly competitive districts such that each
district is predicted to result in a tie. Now suppose that one voter in each
district switches their party allegiance from the Democrats to the Republicans.
The result would be a Republican sweep, where the Republican candidate
wins every district by a single vote. With slightly more than 50 percent vote
share, the Republican party would win all the seats. This extreme hypothetical
reflects a more general trend: competitive maps produce election results that
are highly sensitive to small voter swings. For this reason, there is an inherent
tension under the traditional system between drawing competitive districts
and achieving a certain partisan outcome. Partisan gerrymanders pack
opponents into a smaller number of super-safe districts that they win by a
landslide, and then crack the remaining opponents into a larger number of
moderately safe districts that they lose by a small-but-still-decisive margin.146
Bipartisan gerrymanders carve the state up into an appropriate number of
safe blue districts and safe red districts. To maintain partisan fairness over
shifts in voter preferences, a mapmaker must strategically vary the
competitiveness of districts, and most of them must be uncompetitive.147 In
contrast, MM2 can tolerate more competitive districts, because it can
countermand any seats-votes distortion that competitiveness may produce.
Free from the fear of the huge seat bonus, the mapmaker committed to
partisan fairness can confidently draw more competitive districts. The result
may be a more competitive map.
iv. Third Parties and Independents
By construction, MM2 shuts out third parties and protects the two-party
system. It may be hard for a proponent of multipartyism to support such a
proposal. But there are several reasons to do so. First, third parties are not
thriving under the present system.148 If the choice is the status quo or MM2,
why not support the alternative without gerrymandering and its pathologies?
MM2 also affirmatively supports third parties in a meaningful sense, when
it uses a single-transferable vote for both tiers and reports the results of each
round in the transfer process. This means a voter can express their
preferences for a third party or a third-party candidate without the spoiler
effect. The election results will reflect how many voters gave their top ranking

146. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political
Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551 (2004); Eric McGhee, The Role of Partisan Gerrymandering
in U.S. Elections 3 (Aug. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3341696 [https://perma.cc/R8KY-W8VX] (“The logic of packing and
cracking dictates that a party should win its seats by the narrowest acceptable margins to avoid
wasting voters that could be used to win another seat elsewhere. But incumbents would naturally
prefer to win by broader margins as protection against adverse partisan tides.”).
147. See Cover, supra note 68, at 1212–13.
148. See supra Section II.A.4.
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to a third party or a third-party candidate. The Green (or Libertarian) party
could use this to mobilize support, demonstrate its strength, and push the
Democrats (or Republicans) to shift to the left (or right). In this way, MM2
facilitates third party mobilization much more than the prevailing system.
MM2 also facilitates mobilization for multipartyism. MM2 converts the
two-party structure from an inexorable result of the system to a specific,
alterable design choice. The implementing statute would literally codify
bipartyism in language that qualified the word “party” by the word “major.”
Specifically, the relevant statutory provision would read something like: “The
list seats shall be allocated so that, for each major party, seats share corresponds to vote
share.” To shift from MM2 to MMP, simply strike the word “major.” In this way,
MM2 represents a significant intermediate step between the prevailing system
and MMP. To put it in Dean Gerken’s terms, there may be no path directly
from Here to MMP, but there may be a path from Here to MM2 and a path
from MM2 to MMP.149 Indeed, with the New Zealand experience in mind,
MM2 could be adopted as part of a package that includes a formal study of
multipartyism (blue-ribbon committee and/or citizen commission) with a
referendum following its report.
B. THE DETAILS
This Section canvasses the key design questions a state must address when
implementing MM2.
1. Chamber Size and Class Ratio
MM2 requires a two-class legislative body, with some nominal seats
awarded to individual candidates and some list seats awarded to political
parties. This immediately presents some numerical questions: How many seats
should there be overall? How many nominal seats versus list seats? When
adopting MM2, should a state convert nominal seats into list seats, or just add
more list seats, thereby increasing the overall size of the legislature? I suggest
the state maintain the size of the nominal class, and thus the number of singleseat districts, but add a list class roughly half the size of the nominal class,
thereby increasing the overall size of the legislature by roughly 50 percent.
There may be some drawbacks to increasing overall size. The size of the
legislature may be codified in the state constitution, which may be hard to
amend.150 Also, people are generally skeptical of any proposal to improve
politics by creating more politicians or expanding legislatures,151 though I
suspect people are more concerned about gerrymandering than a larger
149. See generally Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Election Reform, supra note 33 (discussing
the problem of election reform and how to fix it as a “here-to-there” problem).
150. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2 (fixing the size of the state senate at 35 seats).
151. For example, Illinois voters ended a century-old system of cumulative voting in the state
House when it adopted the so-called “‘Cutback Amendment’ which was largely advertised as an
effort to reduce the size of the legislature by one-third.” Rob Richie & Andrew Spencer, The Right
Choice for Elections: How Choice Voting Will End Gerrymandering and Expand Minority Voting Rights,
from City Councils to Congress, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 959, 1004 n.294 (2013).
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legislature.
Ultimately, I prefer to increase the size of the legislative body rather than
decrease the size of the nominal class—for several reasons. A decrease in the
number of single-seat districts would necessarily pit incumbents against each
other. If adopted, this would disrupt pre-existing relationships between
representative and their constituents. And pre-adoption, this prospect would
make the proposal a harder sell with incumbent legislators. For this reason, I
suggest it is particularly important to use chamber expansion rather than seat
conversion in states that cannot adopt MM2 without legislative approval.
As explained above, the adoption of MM2 would not violate the Voting
Rights Act.152 Moreover, the list tier would offer a new way to protect minority
voting rights that does not depend on Section 2 litigation to establish a
majority-minority district.153 However, a decrease in the number of single-seat
districts would necessarily entail an increase in the (area and population) size
of each district, which may disrupt pre-existing majority-minority districts.
When deciding whether to implement MM2 through chamber expansion or
seat conversion, all else being equal, I prefer the approach that preserves preexisting majority-minority districts and consider this an additional argument
in favor of chamber expansion.
As for the relative size of the two classes, a range of values are possible. In
2017, New Zealand’s parliament consisted of 120 seats, 71 in the nominal
class, 49 in the list class.154 The essential idea is to allocate list class seats to
compensate for any distortions in the nominal class. The more list class seats,
the greater the capacity to compensate, and the larger the distortions the
system can handle.
In general, let 𝑙 denote the number of list seats and 𝑛 the number of
as the relative size of the
nominal seats, and define the class size ratio 𝑞
two classes. Let 𝑉 denote the statewide vote share for the party disfavored by
the electoral map, and let 𝑆 denote the share of nominal seats won by that
disfavored party. The minimum class size ratio needed to achieve overall voteseat biproportionality, which I denote 𝑞, can be expressed in terms of 𝑉 and 𝑆.
𝑞

𝑉
1

𝑆
𝑉

In the previous example, the 2018 Wisconsin Assembly map so disfavored
the Democrats that they won only 𝑆
36. 36 percent (i.e., 36 of 99) of the
152. See supra Section III.A.2.
153. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48–51 (1986); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12
(2009). The list tier may also promote racial and gender diversity in the legislative chamber. See,
e.g., Fiona Barker & Hilde Coffé, Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems: The Case of New
Zealand, 71 PARLIAMENTARY AFFS. 603, 603 (2018); Sona N. Golder, Laura B. Stephenson, Karine
Van der Straeten, André Blais, Damien Bol, Philipp Harfst & Jean-François Laslier, Votes for
Women: Electoral Systems and Support for Female Candidates, 13 POL. & GENDER 107, 108 (2017).
154. MPs and Electorates, N.Z. PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates
[https://perma.cc/8YRY-CU4H] (last updated Sept. 12, 2021).
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nominal seats with 𝑉 53 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 of statewide votes. In this case, the
minimum necessary class size ratio is just over 35 percent.
𝑞

𝑉
1

0.53 0. 36
1 0.53

𝑆
𝑉

35.4 percent

If we add 40 list seats to the 99 nominal seats for a total of 139 seats, the
class size ratio 𝑞 is just over 40 percent, a little more than the minimum ratio
of 35.4 percent, and thus enough to achieve perfect biproportionality.
2. Two-Votes and Vote Linkage
While the nominal class allocates each district a local representative, the
list class allocates seats to the top two political parties to align votes and seats,
popularity and power. But here an important design question arises: how do
we determine each party’s popularity? And more specifically: should we give
voters one vote or two?
In the one-vote version, the ballot ask voters a single question: which
individual do you prefer for district representative? Election administrators
aggregate voter responses to this single question within each district to
determine which candidate wins that district’s seat. Election administrators
then aggregate voter responses to this same question statewide to determine
the relative popularity of the top two political parties, treating a vote for a
district candidate as support for that candidate’s party. Election
administrators then allocate list seats based on the countermandering
principle, using the share of votes cast statewide for candidates of each of the
top two parties.
Specifically, let 𝑁 denote a set of 𝑛 |𝑁| single-seat districts in an ordered
sequence with index 𝑖 ∈ Ζ ∩ 1, 𝑛 such that 𝑁 denotes the 𝑖th district in the
sequence. Let 𝑃 denote the set of 𝑝 |𝑃| political parties in an ordered
sequence with index 𝑗 ∈ Ζ ∩ 1, 𝑝 such that 𝑃 denotes the 𝑗th district in the
sequence and the top two parties are 𝑃 and 𝑃 . Without loss of generality, I
will follow the notational convention that the Democrats are 𝑃 and the
Republicans are 𝑃 . Assume each district features one candidate from each of
the top two parties. Let 𝑣 denote the number of ballots cast for the 𝑃
candidate in district 𝑁 . Without loss of generality, define the two-party
statewide district vote share 𝑉 as:
𝑉

∑
∑

𝑣
𝑣

𝑣

The Wisconsin Assembly example supra implicitly uses this approach.
But, of course, this is not the only, or necessarily the best, way to ascertain
the relative popularity of the top two parties. Instead of estimating party
preferences based on expressed candidate preferences, we can simply ask
voters for their party preferences. In the two-vote version of MM2, the ballot
asks voters two questions:
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(1) Which individual do you prefer for district representative?
(2) Which party do you prefer overall?
Election administrators then aggregate voter responses to the second
question to determine the relative popularity of the top two political parties.
Specifically, election administrators allocate list seats based on the
countermandering principle, using relative share of votes cast statewide for
each of the top two parties. Both Germany and New Zealand use this two-vote
approach to traditional MMP.
One argument in favor of the one-vote version of MM2 is that it operates
just like the prevailing electoral schema from the perspective of voters. The
ballot would look identical and the voter would fill it out in just the same way,
by indicating their preference for district representative.
But the two-vote version offers important advantages that justify the shift
to a new ballot structure and voter experience. First, the two-vote version may
provide better incentives for all involved. As discussed above, it gives every
voter a good reason to participate, and every candidate and party a good
reason to compete hard for every vote in every district, even in the safest
district, even in an uncontested district.155
Relatedly, MM2 may more accurately ascertain the relative popularity of
the top two parties if implemented with two votes instead of just one. In the
one-vote version, voters cannot directly express their preferences for political
parties. Party support can be measured only indirectly by aggregating voters’
candidate preferences. Obviously, there is a strong correlation between
support for a candidate in a district race and support for that candidate’s
political party. But the two are not identical, and there are significant
problems with using district outcomes to measure statewide party support.
With only one vote, a voter can only express support for a political party by
voting for a candidate from that party. This creates a serious problem in
uncontested districts, where one of the two major parties runs no candidate,
and the district vote totals thus provide no information about the party
preferences of that district’s voters. Recall that the 2018 Wisconsin Assembly
map featured uncontested races in one third of all districts. Even when a
district race is contested, the votes each candidate earns provides an imperfect
signal of party preferences—for several reasons. One is the well-documented
tendency of incumbent legislators to outperform their party. Partly because
of these incumbency and other candidate-specific effects, political scientists
often prefer to estimate party affiliation based on statewide elections rather
than legislative elections.156 Another is turnout effects. Consider an eligible
voter in an uncompetitive district whose preferred candidate is destined to
lose. Suppose this voter would turn out on election day if the ballot features
two questions, but stay home if the ballot features only one. The two-vote

155.
156.

See supra Section III.A.3.iii.
Nagle & Ramsay, supra note 105, at 119.

A2_COVER_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

106

IOWA LAW REVIEW

11/17/2021 8:34 PM

[Vol. 107:63

version will capture this voter’s party preference, but the one-vote version will
miss it.
For these reasons, I prefer the two-vote version of MM2. But yet another
question remains: if voters directly express preferences for political parties,
should we ignore candidate preferences and rely exclusively on party
preferences to determine relative party popularity? In other words, should the
allocation of list seats depend only on the list vote, or should it also take into
account the nominal vote? In their traditional MMP systems, both Germany
and New Zealand rely exclusively on the list vote, and ignore the nominal vote,
when allocating list seats.157 In his study of mixed-member systems, Matthew
Shugart used the terms “seat linkage” and “vote linkage.”158 Seat linkage
means list seat allocation is partially based on nominal seat share.159 A mixedmember proportional system is defined by “compensatory” seat linkage,
which is equivalent to the countermandering principle, i.e., awarding list seats
to compensate for misallocation of nominal seats.160 Vote linkage means list
seat allocation is partially based on nominal vote share.161 In his canvass of
mixed-member systems around the world, Shugart found no system that
combined seat linkage and vote linkage but considered the approach
plausible.162
There are three arguments in favor of vote linkage. First, vote linkage may
provide the most accurate way to measure party support. For example,
consider a voter who leaves blank the list portion of the ballot but votes for
the Republican candidate on the nominal portion of the ballot. Is it more
accurate to treat this ballot as providing some indication of Republican
support or no indication of Republican support? Second, vote linkage
encourages each political party to recruit the strongest possible candidates
and campaign vigorously in each district. Third, as I explore in greater detail
in the next subsection, mixed-member systems are vulnerable to strategic
circumvention when implemented with two votes and seat linkage, but vote

157. SHUGART & WATTENBERG, supra note 112, at 15 tbl.1.1.
158. Id. at 14–17.
159. Id. at 14 (“If seats are linked, the number of seats a party takes from its list is determined
partially by the number of seats it has won from the nominal tier. . . . [A] formula is applied to
the two tiers combined . . . . The formula establishes a party’s total seat allocation; then list seats
are allocated to bring the party’s representation up to that total.”).
160. Id. (“The form of seat linkage that will most concern us here is the compensatory type,
which produces a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. For example, in Germany a party
wins a percentage of seats nationally that is determined by applying a PR formula to the total
number of parliamentary seats. Each party then fulfills is entitlement of seats by taking whatever
SSDs [(single-seat districts)] it has won and augmenting them with the number of candidates off
the list that it requires to reach its overall entitlement.” (footnotes omitted)).
161. Id. at 15 (“[I]f votes are linked, then the votes that are used to allocate list-tier seats are
not solely the votes that are cast for party lists, because those votes are adjusted by the transfer of
votes from the nominal tier.” (footnotes omitted)).
162. Id. at 16–17 (“[N]o system employs vote linkage along with seat linkage. Such a system
is plausible, however, and might works as follows. . . . No country has yet adopted such a system,
but it would be both logical and feasible . . . .”).
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linkage addresses this vulnerability.
3. Strategic Circumvention
With two votes, voters can split their ballot, casting their list vote for one
party while casting their nominal vote for a candidate not affiliated with that
party—either a candidate affiliated with another party or an independent
candidate. Candidates can strategically choose their party affiliation and
voters can strategically split their ballots. When implemented with seat
linkage but no vote linkage, the allocation of list seats favors those parties who
earn many list votes but few nominal seats, and the number of nominal votes
is irrelevant. To maximize its share of list seats, a party must minimize its share
of nominal seats but maximize its share of list votes.
These considerations suggest two circumvention strategies, which I will
call (1) the dummy-party strategy; and (2) the faux-independent strategy. In
the traditional ballot-split dummy-party strategy, a single political coalition
traditionally organized under a single party could establish a second “dummy”
party to game the system. With two parties, the coalition can essentially earn
double the seats attainable as a single party. One party competes only for
nominal seats, while the other party competes only for list seats. Supporters
of the coalition strategically split their votes, awarding their nominal votes to
one party and their list votes to the other party. The nominal party wins many
nominal seats. The list party earns many list votes but no nominal seats, so the
system automatically allocates this party many list seats. The two parties can
then work together in the legislature and pursue the common policy agenda
of their shared political coalition with greater influence due to their artificially
doubled collective seat share. No political coalition has attempted a dummyparty strategy in Germany or New Zealand, but such abuse has been observed
in Albania, Lesotho, Italy, and Venezuela.163
The faux-independents strategy is less brazen. Instead of establishing a
dummy party, a political coalition organizes as a single party competing for
both nominal and list seats. But some of the party’s nominal candidates
—perhaps the incumbents in the safest districts—strategically register as
independents. These incumbents win reelection, but the system does not
attribute these nominal seats to the political party because the incumbents
were formally independent candidates with no party affiliation. This
artificially reduces the party’s nominal seat share, which may cause the system
to allocate it more list seats. Once they’ve secured reelection, these pseudoindependents can then caucus with their former party, or even change back

163. Arolda Elbasani, Mixed Member Electoral Systems in Transition Contexts: How Has the System
Worked in Albania?, 3 CEU POL. SCI. J. 72, 86–88 (2008); Jorgen Elklit, The 2007 General Election
in Lesotho: Abuse of the MMP System?, 7 J. AFRICAN ELECTIONS 10, 16 (2009); Daniel Bochsler, A
Quasi-Proportional Electoral System ‘Only for Honest Men’? The Hidden Potential for Manipulating Mixed
Compensatory Electoral Systems, 33 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 401, 405 (2012). See generally Eric Linhart,
Johannes Raabe & Patrick Statsch, Mixed-Member Proportional Electoral Systems—The Best of Both
Worlds?, 29 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OP. & PARTIES 21 (2019) (discussing the MMP system in Albania,
Bolivia, Germany, Lesotho, New Zealand and Venezuela).
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their party affiliation.
With the right implementation, MM2 can minimize the risk of either
circumvention strategy. Note that MM2 already makes the dummy-party
strategy far more difficult because it allocates no list seats to third parties. To
pursue the dummy-party strategy under MM2, a single political coalition
would have to run two parties, one that competes only for nominal seats, and
one that competes only for list seats, and the second party would have to earn
list seats, presumably by earning the most, or the second-most, list votes. But
this assumes the “top two” parties are the two parties with the most list votes.
Instead, I propose an alternative definition: the “top two” parties eligible for
list seat allocation are the two parties whose candidates earn the most nominal
votes. With this nominal-vote definition of the “top two” parties eligible for
list seat allocation, the dummy-party strategy fails.
But what about the faux-independent strategy? Recall that Wisconsin
Republicans won 63 of 99 Assembly seats with 47 percent of the 2018 vote.
To see the faux-independent strategy in action, make the following
simplifying assumptions: 25,000 voters cast ballots in each of the 99 districts;
each district was a head-to-head race between one Republican and one
Democrat (no independent or third party candidates); under the two-voter
version of MM2, 47 percent of voters would have cast their nominal vote for
the Republican candidate and their list vote for the Republican party, while
53 percent of voters would have cast their nominal vote for the Democrat
candidate and their list vote for the Democratic party. If Republicans had won
63 of the 99 nominal seats, Democrats would have received 36 of the 40 list
seats to align each party’s overall seat share with its list vote share: Of the 139
seats, Democrats get about 53 percent, i.e., 73, and Republicans get about 47
percent, i.e., 67.
Table 3: Counterfactual 2018 Wisconsin Assembly Election with MM2

Nominal Votes
Nominal
Vote Share
Nominal Seats
Nominal
Seat Share
List Votes
List Vote Share
List Seats
List Seat Share
Overall Seats
Overall Seat Share

Republicans
1163250

Democrats
1311750

47.0%

53.0%

63 of 99

36 of 99

63.6%

36.4%

1163250
47.0%
3 of 40
9.8%
66 of 139
47.5%

1311750
53.0%
37 of 40
90.2%
73 of 139
52.5%

But now consider what would have happened if 13 of those 63 successful
Republican candidates had run as independents, and won an average 60
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percent vote share. (Note that I am assuming that Republicans willing to run
as faux-independents represent safer districts.) Suppose that each of those 13districts featured a head-to-head contest between one Democrat and one faux
independent. In these 13 districts, 60 percent of voters cast a nominal vote
for the faux independent candidate and a list vote for the Republican party
while the other 40 percent of voters cast a nominal vote for the Democrat
candidate and a list vote for the Democratic party.
Since 13 Republicans won seats as faux independents, formal Republicans
won only 50 of 99 seats. This artificially reduces the apparent vote-seat
distortion that partisan gerrymandering produces in the nominal class. If the
list seats are now allocated to align overall two-party seat share and two-party
list vote share for each of the top two parties, Democrats will now get only 31
of 40 list seats, while Republicans would get the remaining nine. Overall,
Democrats would have 67 seats, while Republicans would have only 59 seats.
But the remaining 13 seats would be held by faux independents who would
caucus with the Republicans, producing a 72-seat majority “coalition” of 59
Republicans and 13 “independents.” Democrats would still be much better
off with this outcome than the real outcome. But the faux independent
strategy would essentially flip six seats from Democrats to Republicans,
substitute a 72-68 Republican legislative majority for a 73-66 Democratic
legislative majority, and snatch minority rule from the jaws of structural
countermandering.
Table 4: Counterfactual 2018 Wisconsin Assembly Election with MM2
13 Republicans Run as Faux Independents List Seats Allocated
Based on List Vote Share

Nominal
Votes
Nominal
Vote Share
Nominal
Seats
Nominal
Seat Share
List Votes
List
Vote Share
List Seats
List
Seat Share
Overall
Seats
Overall Seat
Share

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

968250

1311750

195000

39.1%

53.0%

7.9%

50 of 99

36 of 99

13

50.5%

36.4%

13.1%

1163250

1311750

/

47.0%

53.0%

/

9 of 40

31 of 40

/

22.5%

77.5%

/

59 of 139

67 of 139

13 of 139

42.4%

48.2%

9.4%
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This example demonstrates how the faux-independent strategy can
circumvent MM2—when list seats are allocated exclusively on the basis of the list vote,
i.e., without vote linkage. But in the preceding section, I identified powerful
arguments in favor of voter linkage: (1) to get a more accurate measure of
relative party support; and (2) to incentivize each political party to recruit the
strongest possible candidates and campaign vigorously in each district. And
here’s the third argument for vote linkage: it mitigates the impact of the fauxindependent strategy. To see how, consider the same example, but this time
with vote linkage. Specifically, the system will now allocate list seats to align,
for each of the top two parties, overall seat share with overall vote share, based
on the sum of a party’s list votes and its candidate’s nominal votes.
Under this approach, the faux-independent strategy still reduces the
number of nominal seats attributed to the Republican party. But it also
reduces the number of nominal votes attributed to the Republican party,
which reduces the Republican party’s overall vote share and its corresponding
allocation of list seats. So while Republicans net three seats with this strategy,
the Democrats still win a majority of seats overall, and MM2 still achieves
majority rule.
Table 5: Counterfactual 2018 Wisconsin Assembly Election with MM2
13 Republicans Run as Faux Independents List Seats Allocated
Based on Overall Vote Share

Nominal Votes
Nominal
Vote Share
Nominal Seats
Nominal
Seat Share
List Votes
List
Vote Share
List Seats
List
Seat Share
Overall Votes
Overall
Vote Share
Overall Seats
Overall
Seat Share

Republicans
968250

Democrats
1311750

Independents
195000

39.1%

53.0%

7.9%

50 of 99

36 of 99

13

50.5%

36.4%

13.1%

1163250

1311750

/

47.0%

53.0%

/

6 of 40

34 of 40

/

22.5%

77.5%

/

2131500

2623500

44.8%

55.2%

56 of 139

70 of 139

13 of 139

40.3%

50.4%

9.4%

Of course, the faux-independent strategy has a greater effect when more
partisans run as independents. But there are costs, risks, and coordination
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problems that may limit the number of partisans willing to run as
independents. And electoral rules could further limit this strategy. For
example, consider a rule that a party must challenge at least 85 percent of
district races in order to qualify as a top-two party eligible for list seat
allocation.
In light of the foregoing analysis, I recommend the two-vote version of
MM2 with a nominal-vote definition of top-two and vote linkage, where list
seat allocation is based on overall vote share rather than list vote share alone.
I am hopeful this system can withstand both dummy-party and fauxindependent circumvention strategies. But I recommend further study of the
circumvention question, including other possible mechanisms to deter and
thwart circumvention strategies.
4. Ranked Choice and Vote Transfer
Up to this point, I have assumed that each voter, for each question,
indicates their single top choice, and election administrators simply add up
top-choices, awarding nominal seats based on the plurality voting formula and
awarding list seats to align overall two-party seat share and overall two-party
vote share, computed again by simply adding up top-choices. But MM2 could
also be implemented with ranked choices, both for the nominal vote and the
list vote, and there are strong reasons to consider this approach.
As discussed above, AES uses single-choice voting and the plurality
formula, supplemented in only two states with a run-off if no candidate wins
a majority in the general election.164 This approach has the virtues of
familiarity and simplicity, easy for voters to understand and for election
officials to administer. But it also has well-known, significant drawbacks. With
more than two candidates, single-choice voting and the plurality formula can
elect a candidate opposed by most voters.165 This may occur due to “votespoiling,” where the less popular major party candidate prevails because a
third-party candidate peels off enough votes from the more popular major
party candidate,166 or “vote-splitting,” where a candidate with minority
support wins because the opposition splits their votes among two or more
alternatives.167 In the context of legislative elections, support for third party
or independent candidates could produce a plurality-majority vote-seat
inversion, where a party could win a majority of seats with a plurality, but not
a majority, of votes. From 1968 to 2016, plurality-majority vote-seat inversion
has occurred 68 times in state legislative elections, 35 for state upper
chambers and 33 for state lower chambers.168 Georgia and Louisiana avoid
164. See supra Section II.A.1.
165. Pildes & Parsons, supra note 37 (manuscript at 115–16).
166. See note 59 and accompanying text.
167. Like Bill Clinton winning the 1992 presidential elections when conservatives split their
votes between Republican incumbent George H. W. Bush and independent challenger Ross
Perot. See Christoffer Dunstan, The Systematic Exclusion of Third Parties in American Politics, 4 L.
& SOC’Y J. U.C. SANTA BARBARA 41, 55 (2004).
168. Seifter, supra note 9 (manuscript at 28–29).
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this possibility by holding a subsequent run-off election whenever no
candidate wins an absolute 50 percent +1 majority in the general election.169
This approach has its own disadvantages: The cost and inconvenience of
another election, which will likely have lower voter turnout than the first, and
an extended period of uncertainty before the winner is finally determined.170
Under the psychological Duverger effect, third party and independent
voters and candidates anticipate the risk of vote-spoiling and behave
accordingly. Instead of expressing her true preference, a voter may act
strategically, hold her nose, and vote for the lesser of two evils, to avoid votespoiling, and to have her say on which of the two major party candidates
prevail. Or she might not turn out at all. Similarly, a prospective third party
or independent candidate might simply decide against running because he
has no realistic prospect of success, only a realistic prospect of playing the
spoiler. For this reason, single-choice voting fails to accurately measure latent
demand for third party candidates.
Given the disadvantages of single-choice voting, state and local
governments across the United States are increasingly embracing rankedchoice voting.171 Under ranked-choice voting, the voter ranks the options,
marking 1 by her top choice, 2 by her second choice, 3 by her third choice,
and so forth. These preferences are then aggregated through an iterative
process of candidate elimination and vote transfer, taking into account a
voter’s second-choice if her first-choice candidate loses (and her third-choice
if her second-choice candidate loses). Through this reallocation mechanism,
ranked-choice voting avoids vote-spoiling, ensures the winner enjoys majority
support, and permits voters to support third-party or independent candidates
without inadvertently helping their least-preferred candidates. Ranked-choice
voting may have additional salutary effects: less negative campaigning and
more civility;172 more candidates and a more diverse group of elected
officials.173 However, ranked-choice voting may have other disadvantages,
related to voter confusion, ballot exhaustion, and administrative burdens.174

169. Runoff Election, supra note 44.
170. Pildes & Parsons, supra note 37 (manuscript at 118).
171. As of June 2021, FairVote projects that 53 jurisdictions will use ranked-choice voting in
their next elections. Where Ranked Choice Voting is Used, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/
where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used [https://perma.cc/D8TR-CCKF] (last updated Aug. 19,
2021). This count includes two states (Maine and Alaska), one county, 23 cities and towns
participating in a municipal pilot program authorized by the Utah legislature, and 26 cities
outside of Utah. Id.
172. Martha Kropf, Using Campaign Communications to Analyze Civility in Ranked Choice Voting
Elections, 9 POL. & GOVERNANCE 280, 290 (2021); Eamon McGinn, Rating Rankings: Effect of
Instant Run-Off Voting on Participation and Civility 14–16 (Oct. 8, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), http://eamonmcginn.com.s3-website-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/papers/IRV
_in_Minneapolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK3A-V6WN].
173. Sarah John, Haley Smith & Elizabeth Zack, The Alternative Vote: Do Changes in Single‐
Member Voting Systems Affect Descriptive Representation of Women and Minorities?, 54 ELECTORAL STUD.
90, 98–99 (2018).
174. Joseph Anthony, Amy Fried, Robert Glover & David C. Kimball, Ranked Choice Voting in

A2_COVER_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/17/2021 8:34 PM

TWO-PARTY STRUCTURAL COUNTERMANDERING

113

The motivating objective of MM2 is to accomplish two-party structural
countermandering: eliminate gerrymandering and associated pathologies
while maintaining two-party legislative majoritarianism and personal,
geographic representation via single-seat electoral districts. MM2 can perform
this function without any ranked-choice voting, relying solely on single-choice
voting in both the nominal and list tiers. MM2’s nominal tier single-seat
district elections can use single-choice voting with a plurality (or majority)
electoral formula, just like states do now under AES. The two-vote version of
MM2 can similarly use single-choice voting for the list vote, asking each voter
to indicate the single political party she most prefers. Election officials can
then simply ignore ballots cast for third parties, and compute the vote totals
for the top two parties. With the vote linkage approach I advocate for supra,
election officials can simply ignore ballots cast for third party or independent
candidates, and compute the vote totals for candidates affiliated with the top
two parties.
However, ranked-choice voting may enhance MM2 by avoiding votespoiling and vote-splitting, allowing voters to express their true preferences,
boosting voter turnout and external efficacy, reducing negative campaigning
and polarization, and promoting more civility, candidate entry, and chamber
diversity. I suspect these benefits outweigh ranked-choice voting’s costs. If so,
I support implementing MM2 with ranked-choice voting.
For MM2’s nominal tier single-seat district elections, ranked-choice
voting would operate just as described above. For the allocation of MM2’s list
tiers, ranked-choice voting could be used to account for every voter’s
preference between the top two parties, even those voters who most prefer
third parties, third-party candidates, or independent candidates. As explained
above, I propose a two-vote version of MM2 with vote linkage. Under this
approach, list seats are allocated to align, for each of the top two parties,
overall seat share with overall vote share, and overall vote share takes into
account both the list vote for each party and the nominal vote for each party’s
candidates. In the ranked-choice vote version of MM2, use the eliminate-andtransfer process to aggregate over voter’s preferences. To determine the list
vote for each of the top two parties, keep eliminating the party with the fewest
list votes and transferring that party’s ballots until only two parties remain with
list votes. To determine the nominal vote for each of the top two parties,
perform an analogous process of elimination and transfer, ignoring votes for
independent candidates and otherwise treating a vote for a candidate as a vote
for that candidate’s party, until only two parties remain with nominal votes.
If MM2 is implemented with ranked-choice voting, I suggest election
officials make public the vote tallies at each stage of the process. This
promotes transparency, but also provides an objective measure of the latent
demand for third parties and third-party candidates.

Maine from the Perspective of Local Election Officials, ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2021); Craig M.
Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, Ballot (and Voter) “Exhaustion” Under Instant Runoff Voting: An
Examination of Four Ranked-Choice Elections, 37 ELECTORAL STUD. 41, 47 (2015).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Electoral system reform is a big ask, and may prove to be a Sisyphean
effort. For this reason, anyone proposing to change a long-used electoral
system bears the burdens of production and persuasion, and the standard of
proof should be commensurate with the scope of the relief requested. The
alternative system must be presented with sufficient detail to facilitate
rigorous scrutiny, and the system must withstand that scrutiny. It is not
enough to show that the current system has flaws or that the proposed system
might offer advantages. The current system’s flaws must be so profound, and
the proposed system’s advantages so compelling, that it is worth investing in
the reform effort, and pushing the boulder up the hill. That is precisely the
claim I mean to make. The current system profoundly disserves American
democracy. A strategy of constraint is insufficient. MM2 would be a gamechanger. And the game must change. I hope this Article has succeeded in
persuading the reader of these claims, or at least providing enough support
to survive a motion to dismiss.
If so, there is much more to consider, which I hope to address in future
work. In which state might a push for MM2 prove most successful? Michigan
comes to mind. It has recently experienced egregious partisan gerrymanders
that produced vote-seat inversions.175 And Michiganders can use the initiative
process to change the electoral system directly, bypassing the legislature.176
Indeed, they used this process in 2018 to adopt an independent redistricting
commission.177 Another possibility is Idaho, a state so deep red that MM2
would not threaten Republican control, and one of the few states where the
legislature itself established a bipartisan redistricting commission.178
This Article has focused on state legislative chambers. In a subsequent
piece, I plan to explore prospects for MM2 in congressional elections. In this
context, the number of seats is much smaller, exhibits far greater inter-state
variation, and is quite likely fixed—unless Congress decides to expand the size
of the House of Representatives for the first time in almost a century.179 This
175. See generally League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d 867 (E.D.
Mich. 2019), vacated sub nom.; Chatfield v. League of Women Voters of Mich., 140 S. Ct. 429
(2019) (providing an example of a case addressing partisan gerrymandering in Michigan). In
2018, Republicans won the Michigan House and Senate even though Democrats got more votes
and a Democrat won the governorship. Jonathan Oosting, Why Democrats Won More Votes, but GOP
Won More Legislative Seats in Michigan, DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.
detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/11/20/democrats-republicans-michiganlegislature-realignment/2005251002 [https://perma.cc/A47V-5BRG].
176. MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; id. art. XII, §§ 1–4.
177. Paul Egan, Michigan Voters Approve Anti-Gerrymandering Proposal 2, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Nov. 7, 2018, 5:23 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/06/
proposal-2-michigan-gerrymandering/1847078002 [https://perma.cc/S63H-M52H].
178. Danielle M. Strollo, Note, Fair Reforms for Idaho’s Reapportionment Commission, 56 IDAHO
L. REV. 295, 297 (2020).
179. See generally CAROLINE KANE, GIANNI MASCIOLI, MICHAEL MCGARRY & MEIRA NAGEL,
FORDHAM U. SCH. L., WHY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE EXPANDED AND HOW
TODAY’S CONGRESS CAN MAKE IT HAPPEN (2020), https://www.fordham.edu/download/
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means that a state can only implement MM2 for its congressional delegation
by converting some nominal seats into list seats, thereby expanding the
(population and area) size of each single-seat district, potentially disrupting
pre-existing majority-minority districts, and likely pitting incumbents against
each other.180 And MM2 needs some minimum number of seats overall, so it
can convert enough nominal seats into list seats to accomplish structural
countermandering through compensatory list seat allocation. However, MM2
generally requires fewer seats than MMP, because it only seeks vote-seat
proportionality for the top two parties rather than vote-seat proportionality
for every party. And something like ten seats might do the trick. For example,
in the 2010 cycle, North Carolina had 13 seats in the House of
Representatives.181 Imagine North Carolina had implemented MM2 for
congressional elections by converting three of its 13 seats into list seats. This
would have prevented majority-minority vote-seat inversion unless the
mapmaker had somehow drawn a partisan gerrymander so egregious that it
gave the party with minority vote share seven out of ten nominal seats.182 This
suggests that MM2 could work, at least for more populous states with larger
congressional delegations. Note that the 17 most populous states have at least
nine House Representatives, and they collectively account for 305 of the
chamber’s 435 seats, i.e., over 70 percent.183
MM2 reflects normative and predictive intuitions about the U.S. electoral
and party systems: electoral system reform is imperative, because AES is so
pathological and so resistant to intra-schema constraint; but electoral system
reform is only possible within the confines of the prevailing party system,
because elites invested in the two-party system will successfully defeat any
reform that threatens it. If these intuitions are correct, the only way forward
is to maintain the party system but change the electoral system—to
depathologize the two-party system. MM2 does just that. It maintains
geographic representation and two-party, legislative majoritarianism. But it
uses structural countermandering to achieve a better two-party electoral

downloads/id/14402/Why_the_House_Must_Be_Expanded___Democracy_Clinic.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N9WB-GTAW] (providing nine reasons as to why the House of Representatives must
be expanded).
180. See supra Section III.B.1.
181. For the 2020 cycle, North Carolina will have 14 seats. See 2020 Census: Apportionment of
the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.census.gov/
library/visualizations/2021/dec/2020-apportionment-map.html [https://perma.cc/S7BH-HCPQ].
182. North Carolina Representative David Lewis explicitly supported “draw[ing] the map[s]
to give a partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because he [did] not believe it
would be possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.” Common Cause v.
Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 808 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (alterations omitted), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484
(2019).
183. Directory of Representatives, U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.house.gov/
representatives [https://perma.cc/Q57Y-SJ57] (last updated Aug. 20, 2021) (Arizona (9);
California (53); Florida (27); Georgia (14); Illinois (18); Indiana (9); Massachusetts (9);
Michigan (14); New Jersey (12); New York (27); North Carolina (13); Ohio (16); Pennsylvania
(18); Tennessee (9); Texas (36); Virginia (11); Washington (10)).
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system. Under MM2, the partisan composition of the legislative body is
ultimately determined by the relative popularity of the two major parties, no
matter how the electoral map is drawn, no matter how a party’s supporters
are distributed geographically. Since each party’s power actually reflects its
popularity, every vote matters equally in determining the legislative body’s
partisan composition. By giving every voter an equal say on the relative power
of the two major parties, MM2 promotes voter efficacy and voter turnout,
competitiveness and responsiveness. If we are going to have a two-party
system, MM2 is a far better way to run elections.
The 2010 redistricting cycle was a good decade for partisan mapmakers,
and a bad one for American democracy. As we begin the 2020 redistricting cycle,
the time is ripe for exploring new approaches. Structural countermandering
through MM2 warrants serious consideration.

